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SHOULD COMPETITION POLICY
PROMOTE HAPPINESS?
Maurice E. Stucke*
What, if anything, are the implications of the happiness economics
literature on competition policy? This Article first examines whether
competition policy should promote (or at least not impede) citizens’
opportunities to increase well-being. It next surveys the happiness
literature on five key issues: (i) What constitutes well-being; (ii) How do
you measure well-being; (iii) What increases well-being; (iv) Do people
want to be happy; and (v) Can and should the government promote total
well-being? Although the happiness literature does not provide an
analytical framework for analyzing routine antitrust issues, this does not
mean that competition officials should discount or ignore the literature
altogether. The findings of the happiness literature, as this Article argues,
offer some helpful insights on the current debate over antitrust’s goals. The
literature suggests that competition policy in a post-industrial wealthy
country would get more bang (in terms of increased well-being) in
promoting economic, social, and democratic values, rather than simply
promoting a narrowly defined consumer welfare objective.
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INTRODUCTION
Even the free market’s most stalwart defenders are concerned that
capitalism is in crisis.1 A Bank of England official recently observed that
1. See, e.g., Joseph L. Bower et al., Global Capitalism at Risk: What Are You Doing
About It?, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2011, at 104, 106; Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer,
Creating Shared Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 62, 64 (capitalist system is
“under siege”); Joseph L. Bower et al., Occupy Wall Street Protestors Have a Point, HARV.
BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 15, 2012), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6956
.html?wknews=02152012 (noting that Occupy Wall Street’s concerns “are not very different
from the concerns” the authors heard when talking to “business leaders around the world
about the problems they thought might constitute material threats to the sustainability of

2013] SHOULD COMPETITION POLICY PROMOTE HAPPINESS? 2577
“Occupy has been successful in its efforts to popularise the problems of the
global financial system for one very simple reason: they are right.”2 Our
economic thinking, remarked the Organisation of Economic Co-operation
and Development’s (OECD) Executive Director, “has been distorted by the
overwhelming power of vested interests in the financial sector.”3 The
economic crisis tarnished the ideology of self-regulating, correcting markets
yielding efficient outcomes with little government intrusion.4 The
misguided economic policies preceding the current crisis left many nations
with daunting challenges, including increasing income inequality, climate
change, lower potential output, higher total and long-term unemployment,
mounting public and private debt, and volatile capital markets.5
Policymakers are also reconsidering the objectives of their economic
policies. The neoclassical, pre-crisis economic model “that privileged pure
efficiency and output can no longer be relied on for designing and
evaluating new broader policies, or for measuring a country’s overall
performance.”6 Improving quality of life is now a popular goal, and
understanding the trade-offs and side-effects of different policy options is
an important policy consideration.7

market capitalism”); Frank Kane, Capitalism Crisis a Big Part of Davos Forum, NATIONAL
(Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry-insights/
economics/capitalism-crisis-a-big-part-of-davos-forum. In one recent survey, Republicans
responded most favorably to “capitalism,” with 62 percent reacting positively, compared
with 29 percent responding negatively; meanwhile, 52 percent of independents reacted
positively compared to 39 percent negatively; 47 percent of Democrats reacted positively
compared to 43 percent negatively; and Americans younger than thirty responded least
favorably to capitalism with 43 percent responding positively compared to 48 percent
reacting negatively. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, “SOCIALISM” NOT SO
NEGATIVE, “CAPITALISM” NOT SO POSITIVE: A POLITICAL RHETORIC TEST (2010), available
at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1583/political-rhetoric-capitalism-socialism-militia-familyvalues-states-rights.
2. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability & Member of the Fin. Pol’y Comm.,
A Leaf Being Turned, Speech at Friend’s House, Euston, London 2 (Oct. 29, 2012),
available
at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/
speech616.pdf; see also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S
DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE xi (2012).
3. Robert A. Johnson, A Pathway to Sound Economic Thinking, OECD OBSERVER,
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3763/A_pathway_to_sound_economic_
thinking.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); see also KEVIN PHILLIPS, BAD MONEY: RECKLESS
FINANCE, FAILED POLITICS, AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 71 (2008)
(identifying ten recurring characteristics of U.S. capitalist heyday booms).
4. See JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK,
REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET 247–308 (2009); RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE
OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 113–16, 134–35,
236, 243, 259–60, 274 (2009).
5. Pier Carlo Padoan, A New Vision of Growth and Well-Being, OECD OBSERVER,
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3762/A_new_vision_of_growth_and_
well-being.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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So, too, should policymakers reassess antitrust’s goals. The quest of
uniting competition policy under a single economic goal has failed.8 As
other countries’ experience reflects, competition law has had, and will
always have, multiple economic, political, social, and moral objectives.9 So
where should policymakers turn next for antitrust’s goals? One unexplored
area is whether competition policy should promote a multidimensional
welfare function that includes subjective well-being.
As St. Augustine observed, “It is the decided opinion of all who use their
brains, that all men desire to be happy.”10 But the questions who are happy,
or how do they become so, he wrote, have stirred “endless and angry
controversies, in which philosophers have wasted their strength and
Today, one would add psychologists,
expended their leisure.”11
economists, and legal scholars to the mix. The happiness literature is a hot
stock in academia and policy centers, with books;12 law, economic, and
newspaper articles;13 and academic journals studying happiness.14
Policymakers are taking note. As Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke
recently said, “The ultimate purpose of economics, of course, is to
understand and promote the enhancement of well-being. Economic
measurement accordingly must encompass measures of well-being and its
determinants.”15 France’s Nicolas Sarkozy created a commission, headed
8. See Maurice E. Stucke, Greater International Convergence and the Behavioural
Antitrust Gambit, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 175–79
(Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2012); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 551, 568 (2012) [hereinafter Stucke, Goals].
9. Stucke, Goals, supra note 8, at 595.
10. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD ch. 10, § 1, at 303 (Modern Library 1993).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., DEREK BOK, THE POLITICS OF HAPPINESS: WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN LEARN
FROM THE NEW RESEARCH ON WELL-BEING (2010); BRUNO S. FREY, HAPPINESS: A
REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS (2008); DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006);
CAROL GRAHAM, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AN ECONOMY OF WELL-BEING (2011);
JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN ANCIENT
WISDOM (2006); RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE (2005);
DANIEL NETTLE, HAPPINESS: THE SCIENCE BEHIND YOUR SMILE (2005); WELL-BEING: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
13. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Regulation, Deregulation, and Happiness, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 2369, 2370 (2011); Peter H. Huang, Happiness in Business or Law, 12
TRANSACTIONS TENN. J. BUS. L. 153 (2011) [hereinafter Huang, Happiness in Business];
Peter Henry Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 21.1–
.28 (2010) [hereinafter Huang, Happiness Studies] (collecting articles); Teresa Amabile &
Steven Kramer, Do Happier People Work Harder?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at 7 (Week in
Review); Catherine Rampell, America’s Happiest Man, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2011, at 3
(Week in Review); Wendy Koch, If Money Doesn’t Buy Happiness, USA TODAY (Aug. 1,
2012, 11:55 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/NEWS/usaedition/2012-08-02-Grossnational-happiness_CV_U.htm.
14. Included among the many journals studying happiness are: Applied Research in
Quality of Life; Journal of Happiness Studies; International Journal of Happiness &
Development; and International Journal of Wellbeing.
15. Ben S. Bernanke, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the
32nd Gen. Conf. of the Int’l Ass’n for Research in Income & Wealth, Cambridge, Mass. (via
prerecorded video) (Aug. 6, 2012), 2012 WL 3192727; see also Mark Easton, The Politics of
Happiness, BBC NEWS (May 22, 2006, 17:36 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
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by Professors Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, that
ultimately recommended shifting “emphasis from measuring economic
production to measuring people’s well-being.”16 Measuring well-being, for
the OECD, “has been and will continue to be a key priority.”17 Bhutan uses
a Gross National Happiness Index.18 Eurostat (the European Union’s
statistical office),19 and many other jurisdictions currently are developing
matrices for assessing subjective well-being.20 In 2011, the United
Kingdom’s Office for National Statistics included for the first time
subjective well-being questions in its surveys:
It is increasingly understood that traditional economic measures of
progress are necessary but not sufficient to reflect a nation’s overall
progress or well-being. . . .
There has been increasing interest in the UK and around the world in
using wider measures of well-being to monitor progress and evaluate
policy, to focus on quality of life and the environment, as well as
economic growth, in assessing progress.21

What, if anything, are the implications of the happiness economics
literature on competition policy? Part I of this Article establishes why
competition law should promote (or at least not impede) citizens’
opportunities to increase well-being. With this premise, Part II surveys the
happiness economics literature on five key issues: (i) What constitutes
well-being; (ii) How do you measure well-being; (iii) What increases wellbeing; (iv) Do people want to be happy; and (v) Can and should the
programmes/happiness_formula/4809828.stm (quoting David Cameron: “We should be
thinking not just what is good for putting money in people’s pockets but what is good for
putting joy in people’s hearts.”).
16. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 12 (2009) [hereinafter CMEPSP REPORT],
available at http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf.
17. OECD, HOW’S LIFE?:
MEASURING WELL-BEING 15 (2011), available at
http://wwwu.uni-klu.ac.at/nwohlgem/makrooekonomik/topics/How%20is%20life.%20
measuring%20wellbeing.pdf. The OECD, among others, are arguing for a “multidimensional welfare function” that promotes sustainable growth and innovation, and
improves overall material well-being and quality of life. See id.
18. Bhutan GNH Index, GROSS NAT’L HAPPINESS, http://www.grossnational
happiness.com/articles/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (identifying the kingdom’s nine domains
for its index: psychological well-being, health, education, time use, cultural diversity and
resilience, good governance, community vitality, ecological diversity and resilience, and
living standards).
19. EUROSTAT, FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR WELL-BEING INDICATORS: TASK 4: CRITICAL
REVIEW (2009), available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/gdp_and_
beyond/documents/Feasibility_study_Well-Being_Indicators.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2013).
20. Id. § 2.1–.9 (describing several recent and significant developments in measuring
well-being); see also Christopher Meyer & Julia Kirby, Runaway Capitalism, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 66, 71 (noting that forty-one countries have initiatives to measure
happiness).
21. News Release, U.K. Office of Nat’l Statistics, Update on the ONS Measuring
National Well-Being Programme (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/
ons/dcp29904_255640.pdf.
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government promote total well-being? As Part II concludes, the happiness
literature has not reached the point where it can reorient antitrust’s legal
standards toward promoting total well-being.
But, as Part III discusses, the happiness literature can inform the current
debate over whether competition policy in wealthy societies should
primarily maximize consumer surplus or also promote political, moral, and
social objectives. As this part examines, competition policy never arose to
promote only one economic objective, such as consumer surplus. Antitrust
historically sought to promote political, social, and moral values of fair
competition, dispersal of economic power, and promoting individual
autonomy. Despite the historical concerns about concentrated economic
power, antitrust analysis over the past thirty years overstated the importance
of competitive dynamics that were easier to assess (productive efficiencies
and short-term price effects) and marginalized or ignored what was harder
to assess (dynamic efficiencies; systemic risk; and the political, social, and
moral implications of concentrated economic power). Americans paid the
price. One benefit of the happiness literature is exposing why a competition
policy that seeks primarily to promote consumer surplus is unlikely to
increase total well-being. The United States, after all, was founded on the
premise that democracy can promote happiness. And competition policy, in
dispersing economic and political power and promoting economic
opportunity and individual autonomy, can not only promote a democracy,
but can also promote well-being for the many, rather than the few.
I. COMPETITION POLICY MUST PROMOTE (OR AT LEAST NOT IMPEDE)
CITIZENS’ OPPORTUNITIES TO INCREASE WELL-BEING
When the International Competition Network surveyed thirty-five of its
member countries on the objectives of their monopoly laws, the most
popular goal was ensuring an effective competitive process.22 Likewise,
U.S. courts have observed that the “purpose of antitrust law, at least as
articulated in the modern cases, is to protect the competitive process.”23
But surely this cannot be competition law’s sole or primary goal. A
competitive process is effective only if it promotes some other objectives.
Competition’s value, for many, is not for its own sake but represents the
means “to achieve broader government objectives for the economy or for a

22. UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GRP., INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON
THE OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL
MARKET POWER, AND STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES 2, 6 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 ICN
REPORT], available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc

353.pdf (“Respondents identified ten different objectives of unilateral conduct laws,
regulations, and policies, with all but one member agency identifying more than one
objective as relevant to their unilateral conduct regimes.”).
23. Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1437 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Tal v.
Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d
958, 963 (10th Cir. 1994).
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given industry.”24 Since an effective competitive process is not an end but
the more efficient (or democratic) means to achieve other objectives, three
consequences follow. First, there must be one or more intermediate or
ultimate goals of competition law. Second, one must consider how, and
under what circumstances, the competitive process can effectively promote
these objectives. And third, one must understand how the country’s formal
and informal institutions can foster a competitive process that effectively
promotes these ultimate objectives.
What then is competition policy’s ultimate and proper end? St. Thomas
Aquinas and Aristotle, among others, argued that happiness is logically its
own end.25 If happiness is a complete and self-sufficient end for many
individuals, observed Bentham, then maximizing happiness is the proper
Likewise, the Declaration of Independence
end for government.26
identified as “a self-evident truth” that all men are endowed “by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness,” and recognized the people’s right to institute
a new government, “laying its foundation on such principles and organizing
its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness.”27
Consequently, if well-being is a complete and self-sufficient goal for
individuals, and if promoting well-being is the proper (or at least a primary)
end for government, then competition policy should promote (or at least not
hinder) the community’s ability to maximize well-being.
A. Is Promoting Well-Being Too Much To Ask of Competition Policy?
Some may question Bentham’s premise that promoting happiness should
be every law’s general objective. It is not apparent, for example, how the
federal regulations on frozen cherry pies augment total well-being.28 Why
should competition law bear this burden? Modern antitrust theory says to
24. DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMM., OECD, BRINGING
COMPETITION INTO REGULATED SECTORS: THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2 (2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/compcomm/2005-Roundtable%20on%20Bringing
%20Competition.pdf; see also UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GRP., INT’L COMPETITION
NETWORK, UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKBOOK CHAPTER 1: THE OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES
OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS 3 (Apr. 1, 2012) [hereinafter UNILATERAL CONDUCT
WORKBOOK], available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/
doc827.pdf (noting that there is an expectation that competition will tend to promote welfare
and perhaps other policy objectives).
25. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, AQUINAS’S SHORTER SUMMA: ST. THOMAS AQUINAS’S OWN
CONCISE VERSION OF HIS SUMMA THEOLOGICA 353 (2002) (“[T]hat good which man chiefly
and mainly desires must be of such a nature that it is not sought for the sake of something
else and that it satisfies man. This good is commonly called happiness.”); ARISTOTLE, THE
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 1, ch. 7, at 36 (J.A.K. Thompson trans.,
Penguin Books 1955).
26. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 13, § 1.1
(Prometheus 1988) (1781) (“[G]eneral object which all laws have, or ought to have, in
common, is to augment the total happiness of the community.”).
27. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
28. 21 C.F.R. § 152.126 (2012).
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let competition policy improve the allocation of scarce resources, reduce the
costs of goods and services, maximize overall wealth; and leave well-being
to individual choice or other government policies.29
Even if one disagrees with Bentham, some laws play a greater role in the
economy and daily life. One premise of many developed countries’
economic system of private enterprise is the importance of free
competition.30 Competition and efficiency, an OECD official observed, are
the “policy ‘glue’ that links and binds all economic and regulatory decisionmaking into a coherent framework.”31 The Small Business Act’s policy
declaration summarizes this philosophy:
The essence of the American economic system of private enterprise is free
competition. Only through full and free competition can free markets,
free entry into business, and opportunities for the expression and growth
of personal initiative and individual judgment be assured. The
preservation and expansion of such competition is basic not only to the
economic well-being but to the security of this Nation.32

Congress’s policy statement incorporates several important premises.
First, competition does not exist independent of legal and informal
institutions. As economist R.H. Coase said, “[T]he legal system will have a
profound effect on the working of the economic system and may in certain
respects be said to control it.”33 Consequently, what makes the competitive
process fair or unfair can vary depending upon these legal and informal
institutions.34 The term “competition on the merits” invariably involves
29. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF (1978).
30. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951); ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION
COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library
.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (“[F]ree-market competition is,
and has long been, the fundamental economic policy of the United States.”); EUROPEAN
COMM’N, COMPETITION: GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN EU COMPETITION POLICY: ANTITRUST
AND CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS 10 (2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/publications/glossary_en.pdf (describing “[f]air and undistorted competition” as
“a cornerstone of a market economy”); NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS
& PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 177 (1979);
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 1 (1955) (“Most Americans have long recognized that opportunity for free market
access and fostering of market rivalry are basic tenets of our faith in competition as a form of
economic organization.”); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING
INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 133 (2002), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/12/13/000094946_99092312334240/R
endered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.
31. PAUL CRAMPTON, OECD, COMPETITION AND EFFICIENCY AS ORGANISING PRINCIPLES
FOR ALL ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY POLICYMAKING 2 (2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/2490195.pdf.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2006).
33. R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 717–
18 (1992); see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 38 (1944) (“[Competition]
depends, above all, on the existence of an appropriate legal system, a legal system designed
both to preserve competition and to make it operate as beneficially as possible.”).
34. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (empowering and directing the FTC to prevent
persons from using “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
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normative considerations of unfair competition.35 The legal and informal
institutions provide the rules of the game necessary for that type of
competition to function effectively36 and thereby affect the market
participants’ incentives.37 The institutional constraints determine, in part,
the market’s performance. The rules help define the opportunity set in the
economy, and changing the rules can lead to different outcomes.38 For
instance, if the law rewards (or is indifferent to) monopolization,
monopolies will likely arise in markets conducive to monopolization.39
Second, some types of competition (“full and free”) can augment total
well-being. Other types of competition, such as the “exploitation of child
labor, the chiseling of workers’ wages, the stretching of workers’ hours, are
not necessary, fair, or proper methods of competition”40 and hinder wellbeing.41
Third, competition can increase multiple dimensions of well-being, such
as promoting material well-being and quality of life by increasing

deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (“[The FTC] in measuring a practice against the elusive, but
congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public
values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the
antitrust laws.”); HAYEK, supra note 33, at 36.
35. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
n.32 (1985) (defining exclusionary conduct as behavior that “not only (1) tends to impair the
opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or does
so in an unnecessarily restrictive way” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 588–89 (1957) (“The primary issue
is whether du Pont’s commanding position as General Motors’ supplier of automotive
finishes and fabrics was achieved on competitive merit alone, or because its acquisition of
the General Motors’ stock, and the consequent close intercompany relationship, led to the
insulation of most of the General Motors’ market from free competition, with the resultant
likelihood, at the time of suit, of the creation of a monopoly . . . .”).
36. See DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 232–65 (1998) (noting the ordoliberal concept of shaping rules for
this market game so that only quality of performance (merit) determines “market success”);
STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 52; Wolfgang Kerber, Competition, Innovation and Maintaining
Diversity Through Competition Law, in ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO COMPETITION LAW:
FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 15 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1543725.
37. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 52, 158
(2005) (“How the game is actually played is a consequence of the formal structure [e.g.,
formal rules, including those set by the government], the informal institutional constraints
[e.g., societal norms and conventions], and the enforcement characteristics.”).
38. Kerber, supra note 36, at 16.
39. See NORTH, supra note 37, at 50.
40. 83 CONG. REC. 5994 (1938) (message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the
Senate recommending the strengthening and enforcement of antitrust laws).
41. Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 36–37 (1987) (construing 29
U.S.C. § 202(a), where industries whose labor conditions are detrimental to the maintenance
of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers constitute an unfair method of competition).
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opportunities for expression, personal initiative, and individual judgment,
thereby advancing our democratic ideals.42
Accordingly, competition does not exist abstractly but is defined in part
by legal institutions. Legal institutions (including competition law)43 and
informal ethical, moral, and social norms44 can promote well-being to the
extent that they deter unfair competition and promote fair and free
competition, free entry into business, and opportunities for the expression
and growth of personal initiative.45 The stronger one’s faith in competition
as a form of economic organization, the greater the role of legal and
informal norms in promoting a competitive process that effectively
augments total well-being. For if “fair” competition reduces well-being and
increases misery, citizens will inquire why their laws and informal norms
promote this kind of competition, and why the incentives and regulatory
framework cannot be altered for a fairer competitive process that will likely
increase well-being.
Consequently, competition law can play an important role in promoting
fair competition by defining and deterring unfair competition, as well as by
maintaining a competitive process that promotes other important
democratic ideals. The Supreme Court made this logical connection when
42. See, e.g., United States v. W. Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 326 (D.D.C. 1991)
(predicting that “the concentration of the sources of information of the American people in
just a few dominant, collaborative conglomerates . . . would be inimical to the objective of a
competitive market, the purposes of the antitrust laws, and the economic wellbeing of the
American people”), aff’d, 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Tingsrätt [TR] [Stockholm
District Court] ¶ 22 2011-02-17 C-52/09 (Swed.), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0052:EN:HTML (noting that the function
of E.U. competition rules “is precisely to prevent competition from being distorted to the
detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the
well-being of the European Union”); EUROPEAN COMM’N, REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
2010 ¶ 32, at 11 (2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=COM:2011:0328:FIN:EN:PDF (discussing how competition policy takes into account
the protection of the environment and sustainable growth).
43. Smalley & Co. v. Emerson & Cuming, Inc., 13 F.3d 366, 368 (10th Cir. 1993)
(“[T]he fundamental objective of our antitrust laws is to promote fair competition for the
benefit of all consumers.” (citing Seidenstein v. Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc., 769 F.2d 1100,
1106 (5th Cir. 1985)); Kirkland v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 425 F. Supp. 1111, 1115 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (noting that tort of unfair competition “is an equitable concept, resting on general
principles of fairness in business practices”).
44. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD
PEOPLE (2011) (arguing that conscience is a powerful force for our economic, social, and
political lives); Joseph Henrich et al., Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution
of Fairness and Punishment, 327 SCIENCE 1480, 1480 (2010) (studying how informal
religious norms can play an important role in supporting a competitive market economy).
45. For an evolutionary perspective of competition policy and the importance of
fairness, see Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the
Eclipse of the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and
Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469 (2011); Thomas J. Horton. Fairness
and Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1004&context=thomas_horton; Thomas J. Horton, Unraveling the Chicago/Harvard
Antitrust Double Helix: Applying Evolutionary Theory To Guard Competitors and Revive
Antitrust Jury Trials, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 615 (2012).
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describing the competition laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise”: the competition laws
“are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our freeenterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms.”46
B. Does Competition Policy Reduce Misery
Rather Than Increase Well-Being?
Another objection to this Article’s initial premise follows Winston
Churchill’s statement about democracy, namely that capitalism is the worst
form of economy except all other forms that have been tried.47 Competition
and a market economy do not promote well-being; they simply make us less
miserable than other known economic systems.
Even if competition promotes misery, policymakers can lessen the
misery by prohibiting unfair methods of competition. A competition policy
that simply involves a rush for scarce resources—where many are trampled
or left scrambling for the scraps—would appeal to the few who captured the
resources.
Consequently, whatever one’s competition policy objectives,
“[e]conomic things matter only in so far as they make people happier.”48 If
one’s antitrust goal were promoting consumer or total welfare, then what is
welfare but “the state of doing well especially in respect to good fortune,
happiness, well-being, or prosperity.”49 However defined, economic
definitions of welfare typically extend beyond static price competition or
efficiencies to subjective well-being.50 Even if one’s definition of welfare
excluded subjective well-being, one confronts the issue of competition
law’s ultimate aim. Suppose that a country’s citizens’ physical and mental
health deteriorates as a result of the country’s competition policy, the
citizens’ isolation and distrust increase, and their freedom and self46. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
47. Sir Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons (Nov. 1947), reprinted in
THE INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS § 231(7), at 146 (1970) (“Democracy is the
worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to
time.”).
48. Andrew J. Oswald, Happiness and Economic Performance, 107 ECON. J. 1815, 1815
(1997); see also Huang, Happiness in Business, supra note 13, at 160.
49. Welfare, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
welfare (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
50. See, e.g., JOHN BLACK ET AL., OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2008),
available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199237043.001.0001/
acref-9780199237043-e-3354?rskey=QMJdVE&result=2&q=welfare (“The level of welfare
measures the degree of contentment of an individual or a society.”); OECD, GLOSSARY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION ECONOMICS AND COMPETITION LAW 29, available at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf (“Consumer welfare refers to the individual
benefits derived from the consumption of goods and services. In theory, individual welfare is
defined by an individual’s own assessment of his/her satisfaction, given prices and
income.”); Economics A to Z, ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/economics-a-toz/w#node-21529313 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (“Economists use it to describe the well
being of an individual or society, as in ‘Are tax cuts welfare-enhancing?’”).
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determination decrease. In such a case, competition officials and courts
could not effectively advocate their competition policy as being “there to
help us achieve economic prosperity and increase the welfare of society.”51
II. OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES IF COMPETITION POLICY SHOULD
INCREASE TOTAL WELL-BEING
Ultimately, as Part I argues, competition policy promotes fair
competition while preserving economic freedom, with the ultimate aim of
increasing total well-being. In accepting this initial premise, policymakers
confront five important issues: first, what constitutes well-being; second,
how does the government measure well-being; third, what augments wellbeing; fourth, do people want to be happy; and finally, can and should the
government promote subjective well-being?
This part surveys the
happiness economics literature to address these five issues.
A. What Constitutes Well-Being?
If competition policy’s ultimate aim is to increase total well-being, the
first challenge is defining well-being. Well-being, the literature recognizes,
is multifaceted. It includes “an overall evaluation of one’s life; . . . as
experienced in day-to-day living; . . . as influenced by innate character traits
such as positive and negative affect; and . . . as quality of life broadly
defined.”52
The happiness economics literature distinguishes Bentham’s hedonic
happiness and Aristotle’s eudaimonia.53 For Bentham, happiness is derived
from maximizing pleasure (which goes beyond the pleasures of sense and
wealth) and minimizing pain.54 Bentham’s happiness is synonymous with
pleasure, advantage, good, or benefit.55 For Aristotle, a happy life is
achieved when “one is engaged in action and contemplation in accordance
with virtue.”56 Well-being is derived from a meaningful and virtuous life,
one with self-actualization, personal growth, and civic virtue.57 Well-being
consists of life satisfaction or developing and fulfilling one’s potential.58

51. K. Van Miert, Speech on the Role of Competition Policy in Modern Economies
Before the Danish Competition Council (Oct. 11, 1997), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/speeches/text/sp1997_061_en.html.
52. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 24; see also BOK, supra note 12, at 9–10; Alois Stutzer
& Bruno S. Frey, Recent Advances in the Economics of Individual Subjective Well-Being,
77 SOC. RES. 679, 680 (2010).
53. Antonella Delle Fave et al., The Eudaimonic and Hedonic Components of
Happiness: Qualitative and Quantitative Findings, 100 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 185 (2011);
Huang, Happiness Studies, supra note 13, at 21.4–.5.
54. BENTHAM, supra note 26, at ch. 5, § 1.
55. Id. at ch. 1, § 3; FREY, supra note 12, at 5, 17–18 (discussing happiness as a positive
and negative effect); GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 4.
56. ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, at 39.
57. See Delle Fave et al., supra note 53, at 186.
58. FREY, supra note 12, at 5.
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Rather than define well-being along one dimension (e.g., pleasure), the
happiness literature generally recognizes well-being as multidimensional.
For example, the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission identified within the
academic literature and various happiness measurement initiatives the
following dimensions of well-being: “(i) Material living standards (income,
consumption and wealth); (ii) Health; (iii) Education; (iv) Personal
activities including work; (v) Political voice and governance; (vi) Social
connections and relationships; (vii) Environment (present and future
conditions); [and] (viii) Insecurity, of an economic as well as a physical
nature.”59
Likewise many people in one study defined happiness along multiple
dimensions:
life domains associated with happiness (with family,
interpersonal relations, and health being the most popular) and
psychological components (harmony/balance, positive emotions, wellbeing).60 With respect to the psychological components, those surveyed
generally referred to both hedonic and eudaimonic aspects.61 On average,
they also rated their life’s meaningfulness higher than their happiness,
which they ranked higher than their satisfaction with their lives.62
Consequently, if competition policy should increase total well-being, one
issue is whether competition policy should promote primarily one
dimension (e.g., hedonic) or multiple dimensions of well-being. This can
be important. As discussed below, some factors (such as income) are
correlated more strongly with some dimensions of well-being (such as life
satisfaction) than other dimensions (experienced, everyday happiness).63
Ultimately, “[h]appiness is an intrinsically pluralistic concept.”64
B. How To Measure Well-Being
A second policy issue is which objective and subjective measures
policymakers should employ to measure well-being, and to what extent do
biases, heuristics, and imperfect willpower distort these measurements.
59. CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 14–15, 151–53 (discussing Sen’s capabilities
and functionings approach); MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, FLOURISH: A VISIONARY NEW
UNDERSTANDING OF HAPPINESS AND WELL-BEING 11–12 (2011) (developing an integrated
framework for happiness; one that involves positive emotion, engagement, relationships,
meaning and purpose, and accomplishment. Pleasure involves “positive emotion; what we
feel: pleasure, rapture, ecstasy, warmth, comfort, and the like”; engagement “is about flow:
being one with the music, time stopping, and the loss of self-consciousness during an
absorbing activity”; and meaning, which “consists in belonging to and serving something
that you believe is bigger than the self”); Jon Hall et al., A Framework To Measure the
Progress of Societies (OECD Working Paper No. 34, 2010), available at http://search.
oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=std/doc(2010)5&docLanguage=En.
60. Delle Fave et al., supra note 53, at 190, 193–94 (surveying 666 participants from
Australia, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and South Africa).
61. Id. at 200 (hedonic aspects were cited in 23.8 percent of the answers).
62. Id. at 195, 197.
63. See infra Part III.C.
64. Pierluigi Barrotta, Why Economists Should Be Unhappy with the Economics of
Happiness, 24 ECON. & PHIL. 145, 152 (2008).
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1. Assessing the Extent to Which Biases, Heuristics, and Imperfect
Willpower Distort the Measurement of Well-Being
Economists historically assessed people’s utility indirectly by their actual
choices (e.g., choosing to watch a televised football game), rather than
directly by their subjective beliefs or intentions (e.g., believing I should
study rather than watch TV).65 But people’s choices do not always reveal
their actual preferences.66 Heuristics and biases affect decision making,
such as the way the choice is framed.67 Consumers often simply accept the
default option.68 Some lack willpower when making intertemporal choices
(e.g., choosing to watch football rather than study for a test next week).69
People can predict poorly as to what makes them happy and fail to
appreciate the extent to which they adapt to new purchases or wealth.70
Manipulation of consumer choices by business compounds this issue.71
Thus, policymakers cannot reliably infer utility from consumers’ decisions.
65. See CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 43; John Beshears et al., How Are
Preferences Revealed?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1787, 1787 (2008) (“Revealed preference theory
constructs utility functions that rationalize empirical observations of consumer choices and
consumer budget constraints . . . . Economists usually assume that these revealed
preferences are also normative preferences—preferences that represent the economic actor’s
true interests. Economic welfare analysis and policy analysis almost always assume that
revealed preferences and normative preferences are identical.”); Daniel Kahneman & Robert
Sugden, Experienced Utility As a Standard of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE
ECON. 161, 162 (2005).
66. See, e.g., Beshears et al., supra note 65, at 1788 (identifying five factors that
increase the likelihood that revealed preferences will not have normative merit: “passive
choice, complexity, limited personal experience, third-party marketing, and intertemporal
choice”); Daniel Kahneman & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Utility Maximization and
Experienced Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 221, 223 (2006).
67. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 364–74 (2011).
68. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 7–8, 11–13 (2008).
69. See, e.g., Beshears et al., supra note 65, at 1789–90 (discussing intertemporal
choice).
70. See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from
Happiness Research?, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 402, 409–22 (2002); Faruk Gul & Wolfgang
Pesendorfer, Welfare Without Happiness, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 471, 471 (2007); Daniel
Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being,
20 J. ECON. PERSP. 8–9 (2006); Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 65, at 161–81.
71. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand et al., What’s Advertising Content Worth? Evidence
from a Consumer Credit Marketing Field Experiment, 125 Q.J. ECON. 263 (2010); OFFICE OF
FAIR TRADING, THE IMPACT OF PRICE FRAMES ON CONSUMER DECISION MAKING 5–20 (2010),
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/OFT1226.pdf; OFFICE OF
FAIR TRADING, WHAT DOES BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS MEAN FOR COMPETITION POLICY?
(2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/oft1224.pdf;
STEFFEN HUCK, JIDONG ZHOU & CHARLOTTE DUKE, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, CONSUMER
BEHAVIOURAL BIASES IN COMPETITION:
A SURVEY (2011), available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/research/OFT1324.pdf; Maurizio Pugno, The Easterlin
Paradox and the Decline of Social Capital: An Integrated Explanation, 38 J. SOCIO-ECON.
590, 592 (2009) (discussing the power of advertising, especially for children and
adolescents, to induce consumption); John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics and the Quality of
Life, 145 SCIENCE 117, 122 n.9 (1964) (“It is held that the provision of an expanding volume
of consumer goods, among which the consumer exercises a sovereign choice, involves no
value judgments. This might be approximately true if everything the consumer needs were
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Rather than measure utility indirectly, the happiness literature generally
seeks to measure it directly. But if biases, heuristics, and imperfect
willpower reduce the reliability of measuring utility through consumers’
choices, one issue is whether they also reduce the reliability of individuals’
self-appraisals of their well-being.
Framing effects and biases can affect self-assessments of well-being.
Individual responses can depend on the order or wording of questions, the
scales applied, a fortunate event (like the individual discovering a dime
before the questioning), or the current weather.72 One study, for example,
examined the correlation between the responses to two questions: “How
happy are you?” and “How many dates did you have last month?”73 When
the happiness question was asked first, no correlation was found between
the responses.74 But when the dating question was asked first, the two
questions’ responses were significantly correlated.75 In another study,
individuals were asked first to recall either three positive or three negative
recent life events. Those asked to recall positive events reported higher
current life satisfaction than those asked to recall recent negative events.76
Another bias is duration neglect. Individuals assess their instant hedonic
happiness (pleasure or distress at that moment) at times differently from
their remembered utility (retrospective evaluation of a temporary extended
outcome).77 Kahneman and his colleagues tested this with a colonoscopy
experiment.78 Half of the participants had the uncomfortable procedure
extended by leaving the colonscope in place for about one minute after the
clinical examination finished. The other half had the colonscope removed
immediately after the painful examination. The patients who had the
prolonged colonoscopy evaluated the procedure as better even though they
were uncomfortable over a longer period.79 Kahneman described this as
available from the market and if no attempt were made to manage his choice. Conservatives
instinctively but wisely insist that almost all important needs can be provided by the market,
and that management of the consumer is of negligible importance. This enables them to rest
their case on an impersonal manifestation of individual choice. It is also evident that the
preconditions for their case are far from being met.”); Maurizio Pugno, The Easterlin
Paradox and the Decline of Social Capital: An Integrated Explanation, 38 J. SOCIO-ECON.
590, 592 (2009) (discussing the power of advertising, especially for children and
adolescents, to induce consumption).
72. Frey & Stutzer, supra note 70, at 406; Kahneman & Krueger, supra note 70, at 6–7.
73. Norbert Schwarz & Fritz Strack, Reports of Subjective Well-Being: Judgmental
Processes and Their Methodological Implications, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 12, at 63.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 65; see also Angus S. Deaton, The Financial Crisis and the Well-Being of
Americans 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17128, 2011), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17128 (asking political questions first caused a large
negative effect on reported well-being).
77. Daniel Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112
Q.J. ECON. 375, 379–92 (1997).
78. Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 12, at 20.
79. Id.

2590

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

“Peak-End evaluation,” whereby people remember the utility or disutility of
pleasant and unpleasant episodes by averaging the Peak (most intense value
of pleasure or pain) and the pleasure or pain recorded near the experiment’s
end.80 People neglect the experience’s duration. “Peak-End evaluation”
and duration neglect, also found in other experiments, draw into question
self-assessments of well-being; people chose the longer unpleasant option,
which seemingly did not maximize their utility as they were in pain
longer.81
Although biases and framing can affect self-assessments of well-being,
this does not mean that subjective well-being measures are meaningless.
First, consumers sometimes know what makes them happier (such as
exercising), but lack the willpower. So consumers’ self-assessments can
sometimes more reliably measure utility than their choices (e.g., their
inactivity).
Second, to the extent framing or duration neglect bias self-assessments of
well-being, conditions can be imposed to mitigate bias (e.g., by not
prefacing questions of well-being with questions on dating).82
Third, even when biases and framing cause people to incorrectly predict
what will promote their well-being (e.g., trading off a longer commute for a
bigger house in the suburbs), they often can assess their current state of
experienced well-being (e.g., being miserable during the morning
commute). Many people arguably can assess whether they are currently
happy (at least in terms of their hedonic happiness) and the degree of their
pleasure or pain. The findings from the happiness literature are consistent
both internally and with other indicators of well-being.83 “Subjective
measures of well-being have been tested against a wide range of indirect
measures of well-being,” the OECD found, “and generally show the
expected relationships.”84 Answers to life-satisfaction questions are “wellcorrelated with at least five relevant sets of variables: the reports of friends;
the plausible causes of well-being; some plausible effects of well-being;
physical functioning, such as levels of cortisol; and measures of brain
activity.”85 People give similar answers to questions repeated later.86

80. Kahneman et al., supra note 77, at 381.
81. Kahneman, supra note 78, at 19–20.
82. Deaton, supra note 76, at 21 (using a transition question between the political
question and well-being question to mitigate the political question’s negative effect).
83. Alan B. Krueger & David A. Schkade, The Reliability of Subjective Well-Being
Measures 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13027, 2007), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13027 (finding a correlation between 0.5 and 0.7 in overall
life satisfaction measures and affective experience measures in retesting individuals over a
two-week period).
84. OECD, supra note 17, at 267.
85. Richard Layard, Measuring Subjective Well-Being, 327 SCIENCE 534, 534 (2010);
see also OECD, supra note 17, at 267 (“Biological measurements, including the left/right
brain activity, and levels of the stress hormone cortisol show a consistent relationship with
self-ratings of well-being.”); Huang, Happiness Studies, supra note 13, at 21.7; Andrew J.
Oswald & Stephen Wu, Objective Confirmation of Subjective Measures of Human Well-
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People who respond as being satisfied with their lives are also considered
satisfied by family, friends, and experts.87
Consequently, in addition to measuring utility indirectly through
consumers’ choices, policymakers can assess well-being directly. But with
either measure, however, policymakers should consider the extent to which
biases, heuristics, and imperfect willpower affect the measurements.
2. Different Approaches To Measure Well-Being
When the government measures well-being directly through selfassessments, another issue is what questions they should ask their citizens.
The happiness economics literature contains questions about the pleasure or
pain that respondents feel currently or recently from specific activities, their
life satisfaction, the ladder of life,88 and their life’s purpose.89 Since wellbeing, as Part II.A discussed, is multidimensional, well-being, is not
surprisingly, measured differently and assesses these diverse considerations
through:


a global evaluative approach, which “asks individuals to step back
and reflect on their life and make a cognitive assessment of how their
life is going overall, or on certain aspects of their life,”90



an eudemonic approach, which “draws on self-determination theory
and tends to measure such things as people’s sense of meaning and
purpose in life, connections with family and friends, a sense of
control and whether they feel part of something bigger than
themselves,”91

Being: Evidence from the U.S.A., 327 SCIENCE 576, 577 (2010); Stutzer & Frey, supra note
52, at 684–85.
86. OECD, supra note 17, at 266.
87. Stutzer & Frey, supra note 52, at 684–85.
88. Gallup, for example, uses the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale:
Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to 10 at the
top.
The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the
ladder represents the worst possible life for you.
On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this
time? (ladder-present)
On which step do you think you will stand about five years from now? (ladderfuture)
Understanding How Gallup Uses the Cantril Scale Development of the “Thriving,
Struggling, Suffering” Categories, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/122453/
understanding-gallup-uses-cantril-scale.aspx (emphasis omitted) (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
89. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 37.
90. U.K. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, INITIAL INVESTIGATION INTO SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING FROM THE OPINIONS SURVEY 4 (2011) [hereinafter INITIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT],
available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/wellbeing/measuring-subjective-wellbeing-inthe-uk/investigation-of-subjective-well-being-data-from-the-ons-opinions-survey/initialinvestigation-into-subjective-well-being-from-the-opinions-survey.html; see also CMEPSP
REPORT, supra note 16, at 146–47; FREY, supra note 12, at 18–19.
91. See INITIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 90, at 4.
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an experience sampling approach, which randomly asks people
throughout the day what they are doing and their positive and
negative feelings,92



a day reconstruction approach, where participants complete a diary
summarizing episodes from the prior day (when the episode began
and ended, where they were, with whom they were interacting) and
report the intensity of their feelings along nine categories on a scale
from zero to six,93 and



objective measures of people’s material living conditions, their
quality of life, and sustainability.94

One issue is which measure(s) of well-being should policymakers use.95
As two economists observed, most of this empirical happiness work has
been based on “representative, large-scale sampling of individual global
evaluations of life satisfaction.”96 The life-satisfaction measure, they state,
is an “attractive proxy measure” in “blending cognitive judgment and
affective state.”97 But the questions used to measure well-being can capture
different dimensions.
For example, the relationship between one’s income and well-being can
differ depending on whether the person is asked about experienced, day-today well-being or his or her life satisfaction.98 Greater wealth (relative to
others) can enhance evaluations of life satisfaction, but not everyday
experienced happiness.99 As Kahneman aptly observed, “Life satisfaction
is not a flawed measure of their experienced well-being, as [he] thought
some years ago. It is something else entirely.”100
Another issue is that, with some measures, the magnitude of difference in
well-being can be quite small.101 Many people worldwide “claim to be
92. See id.; see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 147 n.2; FREY, supra note 12,
at 20; Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 65, at 175.
93. Kahneman & Krueger, supra note 70, at 9–14; see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra
note 16, at 147 n.3.
94. OECD, supra note 17, at 18; see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 15, 156
(“In most cases, these themes include not just the measures of people’s subjective states
described above, but also measures of their health and education, their daily activities, their
participation in political processes, and the social and natural environment in which people
are embedded and which shape their sense of security.”).
95. See Stutzer & Frey, supra note 52, at 683–84.
96. Id. at 684.
97. Id.
98. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 396.
99. Id. at 396–97; Daniel Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High Income Improves
Evaluation of Life but Not Emotional Well-Being, 107 PNAS EARLY EDITION 16,489, 16,491
(2010) (finding from a U.S. survey of subjective well-being that beyond approximately
$75,000, higher income “is neither the road to experienced happiness nor the road to the
relief of unhappiness or stress, although higher income continues to improve individuals’ life
evaluations”); see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 148.
100. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 397.
101. Timothy A. Judge & John D. Kammeyer-Mueller, Happiness As a Societal Value,
ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Feb. 2011, at 33–34 (noting that 80 percent of national life satisfaction
averages were within one point on a ten point scale, and for developed nations with a per
capita GDP of $20,000 or more, 80 percent of the nations were within half of a point). But
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‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied with their lives.”102 Also, in averaging a nation’s
well-being, one may not necessarily capture well-being that comes at the
expense of others (whether in that country or abroad).103
Accordingly, because well-being is multidimensional, the OECD,
Eurostat, and others advocate that multiple subjective and objective
measures—sensitive to inequalities and distributional issues—be used to
measure well-being.104
C. Determining the Causes of Well-Being
Besides defining and measuring well-being, a third issue, which
preoccupied philosophers and theologians for centuries and is now the
focus of psychologists and economists, is whether well-being can be
increased105 and, if so, what promotes well-being.106
A 2006 survey of the empirical literature found several factors to be
strongly correlated with subjective well-being,107 including personal
characteristics, like age;108 socially developed characteristics, such as
health109 and employment status;110 how the people spend their time,111

see OECD, supra note 17, at 269 (finding a three point gap on an eleven point scale for
OECD and large emerging countries, with countries falling within three groupings (below
5.5, below 7, and above 7)).
102. BOK, supra note 12, at 24–25.
103. OECD, supra note 17, at 273–74 (noting the substantial variation in subjective wellbeing within many countries, including the United States).
104. BOK, supra note 12, at 18–19; CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 16; EUROSTAT,
supra note 19, § 2.3.
105. The consensus is that genetic makeup influences well-being; but the extent to which
genetics makeup does so is unresolved. Jan-Emmanuel De Neve et al., Genes, Economics,
and Happiness, 5 J. NEUROSCIENCE PSYCHOL. ECON. 193, 194 (2011) (finding that
“individuals with transcriptionally more efficient version of the serotonin transporter gene
. . . are significantly more likely to report higher levels of life satisfaction,” and estimating
the “heritability of subjective well-being at 33%, indicating that about one-third of the
variance in individual life satisfaction can be attributed to genetic influences”); David
Lykken & Auke Tellegen, Happiness Is a Stochastic Phenomenon, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 186, 186
(1996) (estimating 44 percent to 52 percent of the variance in well-being is associated with
genetic variation, and in retesting a smaller sample of twins after intervals of 4.5 and 10
years, estimating the “heritability [as a] stable component of subjective well-being
approaches 80%”).
106. See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 25, at 197–98 (questioning whether true and perfect
happiness is attainable on earth).
107. Paul Dolan et al., Do We Really Know What Makes Us Happy? A Review of the
Economic Literature on the Factors Associated with Subjective Well-Being, 29 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 94 (2008).
108. Id. at 98 (referencing studies consistently finding “a negative relationship between
age and SWB and a positive relationship between age squared and SWB” and suggesting “a
U-shaped curve with higher levels of well-being at the younger and older age points and the
lowest life satisfaction occurring in middle age, between about 32 and 50 years, depending
on the study”).
109. Id. at 100 (studies “consistently show a strong relationship between SWB and both
physical and psychological health”); BOK, supra note 12, at 21 (noting how a drop of 20
percent in self-evaluations of health is associated with an average decline in happiness of six
points on a scale of one hundred).
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such as religious activities;112 attitudes and beliefs towards self, others, and
life;113 relationship status, such as living alone, living with a partner or
being married,114 and seeing family and friends;115 and the country’s wider
economic, social, and political environment, such as the degree of
democracy.116
Religious worship, for example, is strongly correlated with well-being.117
Controlling for various factors associated with well-being, one study of
Swiss residents found that going to church was not only positively
correlated with well-being, but well-being “increases (almost)
monotonically with a higher frequency of religious service attendance.”118
Another study found that the repeal of the state blue laws (thereby enabling

110. BOK, supra note 12, at 20–21; CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 149–50; Deaton,
supra note 76, at 40; Dolan et al., supra note 107, at 101 (“Studies consistently show a large
negative effect of individual unemployment on SWB. Models which treat life satisfaction
scales as a continuous variable, tend to find that the unemployed have around 5–15% lower
scores than the employed.”); Lasse Steiner et al., Economics, Religion and Happiness, 190
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND UNTERNEHMENSETHIK 1, 20 (2010).
111. BOK, supra note 12, at 20 (discussing research on how attending monthly club
meetings or volunteering once a month is associated with a change in well-being equivalent
to a doubling of income).
112. Id. at 21–22 (discussing the correlation of religion and volunteering with happiness);
Dolan et al., supra note 107, at 104 (“[E]vidence is fairly consistent and suggests that regular
engagement in religious activities is positively related to SWB.”).
113. CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA 1960–2010, at
262 (2012); Dolan et al., supra note 107, at 105 (“[E]vidence is relatively clear from the few
studies that have looked at trust and the effects are relatively large,” such as several studies
finding “social trust (trust in most other people) is associated with higher life satisfaction and
happiness, and a lower probability of suicide.”).
114. BOK, supra note 12, at 17–18; (“On average, higher proportions of UK adults who
were married, in a civil partnership or cohabitating reported high ratings of 9 or 10 out of 10
for the ‘life satisfaction,’ ‘worthwhile’ and ‘happy yesterday’ questions than people who
were single, widowed or divorced.”); MURRAY, supra note 113, at 256–57 (2012); Dolan et
al., supra note 107, at 106 (“Although there is some variation across studies, [it] seems that
being married is associated with the highest level of SWB and being separated is associated
with the lowest level of SWB, lower even than being divorced or widowed.”); see also
OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, FIRST ANNUAL ONS EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING
RESULTS (2012) [hereinafter UK REPORT], available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/
dcp171766_272294.pdf.
115. Dolan et al., supra note 107, at 107 (observing from studies that “overall, socialising
with family and friends is positively associated with SWB”).
116. Id. at 109–10 (observing that most studies find a positive link between democracy
and life satisfaction).
117. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 70 (finding that “respondents who expressed faith or
religious affiliation—as well as those who practiced their faith—were happier than others”);
MURRAY, supra note 113, at 259–60; Steiner et al., supra note 110, at 9 (“Almost all studies
find a positive and significant relation between religion and happiness.”); Bernard M.S. van
Praag et al., Happiness and Financial Satisfaction in Israel: Effects of Religiosity, Ethnicity,
and War, 31 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 1008, 1009 (2010) (noting that many studies have found a
correlation between religiosity and increased happiness).
118. Steiner et al., supra note 110, at 20; see also Danny Cohen-Zada & William Sander,
Religious Participation Versus Shopping: What Makes People Happier?, 54 J.L. & ECON.
889, 892 (2011).
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working and shopping on Sunday) caused women’s religious participation
and well-being to significantly decline.119
Findings are mixed with respect to other factors associated with wellbeing, such as income.120 Also, significant issues remain when assessing
what factors actually promote or detract well-being, rather than being
correlated with self-reported measures of well-being.121 Does community
activity, for example, promote happiness or are happier people likelier to
engage in community activity? Some studies use natural experiments to
tackle the direction of causation.122 Nevertheless, the causation issue has
not been resolved, thus limiting the government’s ability to recommend
specific legal policies.
D. Do People Want To Be Happy?
Even if social scientists determined the causes of well-being,
policymakers must assess whether people actually desire sustained wellbeing. If a formula for well-being exists, “what joy will [an individual] get
out of functioning according to a timetable?”123
Some evidence supports happiness as an important goal.124 A survey of
college students, for example, found that only 6 percent of respondents
rated money as more important than happiness: “fully 69% rated happiness
at the top of the importance scale, and only 1% claimed to have never
thought about it” and “62% rated life satisfaction at the top of the
importance scale, and only 2% reported never having thought about it.”125
But it remains an empirical question whether most people in their
thoughts, words, and deeds actually seek to maximize well-being.126 As
two economists argue, one problem with well-being generally is its failure
to incorporate other dimensions of experience that people care about, such
as experiencing a range of feelings (including sadness), meaning (i.e.,
people care about the meaning from their activities), capabilities (the range
119. Cohen-Zada & Sander, supra note 118, at 891–92 (finding from the General Social
Survey that respondents with higher attendance of religious services report greater
happiness, and those who attend services more than once a week are about twice as likely to
report being very happy than those who never attend services).
120. Dolan et al., supra note 107, at 112; see also Nattavudh Powdthavee, How Much
Does Money Really Matter? Estimating the Causal Effects of Income on Happiness,
39 EMPIRICAL ECON. 77, 78–79 (2010) (discussing the biases, such as adaptation, associated
with estimating the effect of income on life satisfaction, and the infrequency of large scale
natural or randomized experiments where money is randomly allocated to treatment and
control groups).
121. FREY, supra note 12, at 11; see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 150; Judge
& Kammeyer-Mueller, supra note 101, at 35.
122. Cohen-Zada & Sander, supra note 118, at 891.
123. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, NOTES FROM THE UNDERGROUND 104 (Signet Classics 2004)
(1864).
124. Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, supra note 101, at 32.
125. Ed Diener, Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a
National Index, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 34, 34 (2000) (surveying 7,204 respondents in forty-two
countries).
126. FREY, supra note 12, at 6–7, 164.
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of opportunities available in their lives), and altruistic and moral
considerations (empathy for the poor).127 Humans are capable of far more
than maximizing their utility and “may be judged in a moral framework that
values something greater than the autonomy needed to satisfy individual
preferences.”128 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarizes this
concern:
Even as happiness might fail to suffice for well-being, well-being itself
may be only one component of a good life, and not the most important
one at that. Here “good life” means a life that is good all things
considered, taking account of all the values that matter in life, whether
they benefit the individual or not. Kant, for example, considered both
morality and well-being to be important but distinct elements of a good
life. Yet morality should be our first priority, never to be sacrificed for
personal happiness.129

E. Can and Should the Government Promote Total Well-Being?
Even if citizens desire greater or sustained well-being along some agreedupon dimensions, several concerns arise as to whether the state can and
should directly promote its citizens’ well-being.130
One concern about the government promoting well-being is its
mechanistic view of human beings, where the state can account for (or
reduce) the presumably minor individual differences among its citizens.131
Logically, the state can never fully maximize well-being, unless the state
can perfect each individual’s well-being, which the state cannot do when
individual tastes differ, conflict, or depend on a relative advantage (such as
happiness derived from status goods). In promoting one dimension of wellbeing (e.g., a drug-induced hedonic happiness), the state will not
necessarily maximize well-being if other citizens place greater value on
other dimensions, such as life satisfaction.
Second, the belief that the state must promote its citizens’ well-being
implies that the state, not the individual, is responsible for maximizing well-

127. George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of Decision
and Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1795, 1802 (2008); see also FREY,
supra note 12, at 15–16.
128. Mark A. Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness: A Catholic Critique of
Law and Economics, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 35, 51 (2005); see also CMEPSP REPORT,
supra note 16, at 156 (noting how Sen’s capability approach “treats subjective well-being as
just one aspect of [quality of life] among the many capabilities that people have reasons to
value”); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 273 (2009) (“The central issue is not the
significance of happiness, but the alleged insignificance of everything else, on which many
advocates of the happiness perspective seem to insist.”).
129. Dan Haybron, Happiness, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/
happiness/.
130. BOK, supra note 12, at 46–54.
131. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD AND BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED 326
(Harper Collins 2004) (1932).
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being.132 On the one hand, citizens cannot increase their well-being absent
some collective action. Incremental well-being comes from public goods
(public and environmental safety) that citizens individually cannot obtain,
as well as from other legal institutions.133 On the other hand, concerns
about governmental paternalism arise. At times, people cannot accurately
predict what promotes their well-being.134 As Eurostat stated,
Whilst [citizens’] stated preferences are important, one should be careful
not to confuse them too much with well-being itself. What people say
will improve or harm their well-being may not necessarily actually
improve or harm their well-being.135

While true, the statement nonetheless raises concerns about the loss of
individual accountability and liberty.
A third concern of the state seeking to augment total well-being is that
individual autonomy is devalued.136 If humans were simply a product of
their social condition and “their individual differences were trifling,”
observed Aldous Huxley, “there would be no need for liberty and the state
would be justified in persecuting the heretics who demanded it.”137
Likewise, the Federalist Papers recognize that, “in every political
institution, a power to advance the public well-being involves a discretion
which may be misapplied and abused.”138 Further,
in all cases where power is to be conferred, the point first to be decided is,
whether such a power be necessary to the public good; as the next will be,
in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible
against a perversion of the power to the public detriment.139

With the goal of maximizing well-being, the state could justify
prohibiting (or promoting) activities that it determines reduce (or increase)
well-being. If the state determines that physical exercise and attending
religious services increase well-being, could the state compel or cajole
citizens to bicycle to mass? Or could the government promote a particular
religion to promote religious harmony and well-being?140 One hardly
132. CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 151 (“The concept of freedom emphasises the
importance of empowering people to help themselves, and of focusing on individuals as the
actors of their own development.”).
133. See infra Part III.D.
134. See infra Part III.C.3.
135. EUROSTAT, supra note 19, § 2.7 (recommending that government agencies
synthesize citizens’ stated preferences with empirical evidence on well-being determinants).
136. See Barrotta, supra note 64, at 161.
137. HUXLEY, supra note 131, at 326.
138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
139. Id.
140. The Royal Government of Bhutan, for example, decided in 2005 to develop Gross
National Happiness indicators “to check whether programmes and policies are consistent
with the values of GNH.” 2010 Survey Results: Results of the Second Nationwide 2010
Survey on Gross National Happiness, GROSS NAT’L HAPPINESS, http://www.grossnational
happiness.com/survey-results/index/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). Its efforts have been
widely praised and its human rights record, according to human rights activists and
government reports, is relatively better than some other area countries. But, as the U.S.
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expects atheists or other congregants to be happier as a result. As two
pioneers in the happiness research discuss, the literature mostly assumes a
benevolent dictator, where the government, individual politicians, and
public officials are “able and willing to pursue people’s happiness or to
maximize a social welfare function where individuals’ welfare is proxied by
individuals’ reported subjective well-being.”141 Well-being, as some argue,
presupposes autonomy, which increases the chances that well-being can
arise from the standard of life freely chosen.142
A fourth concern about the government promoting well-being is the rule
of law. Because well-being is multifaceted, the government policies
invariably will conflict, thereby giving the state too much discretion in
choosing the means to promote well-being. For example, hateful, offensive
speech can reduce a listener’s well-being. But “[i]t is firmly settled that
under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their
hearers.”143 Governments currently take different approaches to outlawing
hate speech.144 If promoting well-being were the objective, however, the
State could demand greater latitude in prosecuting speech it finds
detrimental to others’ well-being. This affords the state flexibility and
discretion in punishing some speakers, while protecting others. But in
doing so, the state devalues other quality-of-life factors correlated with
well-being (such as the rule of law, individual liberty, and freedom).145
Accordingly, in promoting well-being, government policies can become
more subjective and less accountable, predictable, and transparent, as the
State chooses how to promote well-being. To the extent that the rule of law
and liberty promote well-being, the state’s ability to augment total wellbeing is inherently limited.
A fifth concern about the state promoting total well-being involves the
concerns over utilitarianism generally.146 As one judge remarked,

Department of State reports, Mahayana Buddhism is the state religion, and the Bhutan
government “discouraged both large and small religious gatherings of non-Buddhists, did not
allow construction of non-Buddhist places of worship, and did not allow non-Buddhist
missionaries to work in the country.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor,
Bhutan: International Religious Freedom Report 2007, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.
gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2007/90227.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). Moreover, “in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, many ethnic Nepalese residents, a majority of whom were Hindu, were
forcibly expelled or voluntarily left as a result of discrimination.” Id.
141. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, The Use of Happiness Research for Public Policy,
38 SOC. CHOICE WELFARE 659, 660 (2011).
142. See Barrotta, supra note 64, at 156–59, 161.
143. Hoye v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 852 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
144. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012) (noting
differences among hate speech statutes adopted in Canada, Denmark, Germany, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom).
145. CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 177–80.
146. See, e.g., SEN, supra note 128, at 277–90; BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 777–80 (1972).
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The due process clause was not meant to codify some arid theory of
utilitarianism. Rather, the requirement of accuracy and minimum
procedural safeguards follows from the fundamental assumption that
government officials will tend to abuse unfettered discretion to oppress
individuals; procedural safeguards place a check on such discretion and
help preserve the substantive liberties and inherent dignity of the
individual.147

One issue is whether the state can trade off some citizens’ well-being to
promote the well-being of others. What promotes some people’s wellbeing, observed the OECD, “may be ethically objectionable or affected by
personal circumstances to which individuals adapt, even if that is not
objectively good.”148 Another issue is whether utility should be maximized
(or sacrificed) today at the expense (or for the benefit) of future generations.
Sixth, even if one accepts that the state should promote total well-being,
can it? Well-being can depend on relative versus absolute consumption.
Absolute consumption depends on the “absolute desirability of the good”
itself, such as the happiness derived from eating an ice cream cone.149
Relative consumption depends on “wealth, acquisition, and consumption
levels relative to others,” such as the purchase of jewelry and
automobiles.150 To the extent that the government policy benefits everyone
and that utility is relative rather than absolute, the government policy fails
to improve total well-being. Promoting overall well-being can lead to an
incongruous result: the government program is circumscribed to selectively
benefit some, even if the program could benefit all.151
Another issue for policymakers is adaptation. People, for example,
generally adapt to higher incomes. So, depending on the government policy
(such as a tax break), the ensuing happiness can be short lived, as people
adapt to the higher living standard. Adaptation also applies to noneconomic
measures. Married people, for example, are relatively happier than single,
divorced, or widowed people.152 But one study shows that the life
satisfaction of German married couples declined from its peak shortly after
marriage.153
147. Frier v. City of Vandalia, 770 F.2d 699, 707 (7th Cir. 1985) (Swygert, J., concurring
in the result); see also United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(noting one major problem with utilitarianism is that “the individual criminal can be treated
very cruelly, to gain some societal advantage even through [sic] the crime is minor—or very
leniently, despite the shocking nature of the crime—if that will on balance benefit society”),
aff’d, 166 F.3d 1202 (2d Cir. 1998).
148. OECD, supra note 17, at 266 (citations omitted).
149. BERND SCHMITT, EXPERIENCE MARKETING:
CONCEPTS, FRAMEWORKS AND
CONSUMER INSIGHTS 44 (2011).
150. Id. at 96; THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Penguin Books
1994) (1899).
151. CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 152 (“Policies supportive of human
development should expand the opportunities available to people, which would be valuable
irrespectively of the effect on people’s subjective states.”).
152. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
153. FREY, supra note 12, at 89.
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Even for absolute consumption, looking around the world today, one sees
governments increasing human misery rather than well-being.
If
governments can promote well-being, why then haven’t citizens, after
revolting against their oppressors, modeled their governments after
Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, whose citizens, on
average, had the highest life satisfaction?154
States that are more intrusive in their citizens’ lives, including communist
countries, do not necessarily have happier citizens. The OECD asked
people around the world to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 their general
satisfaction with their life.155 The average across the surveyed countries
was 6.7.156 Russians, on average, were less satisfied (5.3), with little
One
difference between Russian men (5.3) and women (5.2).157
explanation perhaps is that Russians assess their life differently than the
Swedes. But “[i]n Russia 59% of people reported having more positive
experiences in an average day (feelings of rest, pride in accomplishment,
enjoyment, etc.) than negative ones (pain, worry, sadness, boredom, etc.),”
which again was lower than the OECD average of 72 percent.158 Nor is
there evidence that the Chinese, despite their country’s economic gains, are
more satisfied with their lives.159 The People’s Republic of China, despite
being wealthier (in terms of GDP) than some of the other countries
surveyed, had the lowest reported average life satisfaction.160 Likewise,
one 2006 survey of Cubans in Havana and Santiago found only 25 percent
satisfied with their “freedom to choose what to do with [their] life,” (lower
than the average of 80 percent in the rest of urban Latin America); 34
percent could use their talent as much as they would like, 53 percent could
choose how they spent their day yesterday, 56 percent said they were
“proud of something” done the previous day (compared to 72 percent for
other urban Latin Americans), 63 percent said they experienced enjoyment
the previous day (compared to 79 percent for other urban Latin Americans)

154. Life Satisfaction, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/
topics/life-satisfaction/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. The bottom 20 percent of the surveyed Russian population had a life satisfaction
level of 5, while the top 20 percent rated their life satisfaction as a 5.8. Id.
158. Id.
159. Richard A. Easterlin et al., China’s Life Satisfaction, 1990–2010, PNAS (May 14,
2012), http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/05/09/1205672109.full.pdf (noting that
China’s transition “has been marked by perhaps the highest two-decade rate of growth in
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita ever seen, a remarkable ≥8% per year. Between
1990 and 2009, per capita GDP and consumption in China (in constant dollar terms)
increased by at least fourfold.” (citation omitted)); Kahneman & Krueger, supra note 70, at
15–16.
160. OECD, supra note 17, at 269 (surveying forty countries’ residents using a Cantril
Ladder metric for life satisfaction).
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and 62 percent said they laughed or smiled (compared to 82 percent other
urban Latin Americans).161
It may be that the state can increase total well-being more effectively
through indirect measures, such as fostering civic virtue and limiting
government discretion (through the rule of law, protections of liberty, and
anti-corruption measures), than through direct measures.
Finally, if the state’s mandate were to increase total well-being, besides
the concerns over utilitarianism generally, there is the concern that the state
will manipulate the measurements.162 Citizens would complain if the wellbeing metrics report declines in well-being. So government officials have a
greater incentive to manipulate the measures. In a 2011 Global Happiness
Index, for example, the People’s Republic of China came in first “with a
perfect 100 rating.”163 North Korea came in second, trailing China by only
two points, followed by Cuba (93 points), Iran (88 points), and Venezuela
(85 points). 164 South Korea finished 152nd with 18 points, and the United
States finished 203rd with only 2 points. Who released the Index? The
state-owned North Korean Central Television.165
F. The Happiness Literature Does Not Provide an Analytical Framework
for Addressing Specific Antitrust Issues
Even if these five fundamental issues were resolved, the happiness
literature does not provide an analytical framework for addressing specific
antitrust issues, such as the legality of a merger or a monopolist’s conduct.
Nor does the happiness literature provide sufficient guidance to reorient
current antitrust legal standards toward the goal of promoting total wellbeing. Courts and agencies would still assess the alleged anticompetitive
restraint’s likely competitive effects and deduce from the competitive
effects whether total well-being would increase or decrease. Determining
various restraints’ competitive effects is often daunting for courts and
agencies. Adding well-being to the courts’ and agencies’ analysis
complicates matters by adding another (and seemingly superfluous) step.
If the agency or court sought to avoid the competitive effects analysis
altogether and ask citizens how a merger or restraint would impact their
well-being, this inquiry could be subject to the aforementioned behavioral
biases. One risk is that market participants, unable to assess how the
restraint will affect them, would substitute an easier question (how do I feel
161. Cubans Show Little Satisfaction with Opportunities and Individual Freedom,
WORLD PUB. OPINION (Jan. 10, 2007), http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brlatin
americara/300.php?lb=brla&pnt=300&nid=&id=.
162. FREY, supra note 12, at 166.
163. Find a Kingdom of Happiness: Would You Be Happier Somewhere Else?, COLORS
(Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.colorsmagazine.com/stories/magazine/83/story/find-a-kingdomof-happiness.
164. Id.
165. Id.; New Happiness Survey Finds North Korea # 2 According to N. Korean TV,
GROSS NAT’L HAPPINESS (June 6, 2011), http://new.gnhusa.org/surveys/new-happinesssurvey-finds-north-korea-2-according-to-n-korean-tv/.
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about big business or mergers involving them) for the harder question (may
this merger substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly,
and, if so, how will that affect my well-being).166
Not surprisingly, one scholar did not believe that the happiness literature
could significantly inform the regulation of natural monopolies: “[T]he
idea of experience sampling as a way to guide policy with respect to natural
monopolies seems more like science fiction than anything else.”167
Competition policy, as Part I discusses, should increase total well-being.
But as this Part observes, important issues remain, such as what dimensions
of well-being should competition policy promote, what measures of wellbeing should be employed, what promotes well-being, and whether the
government can and should promote total well-being. As the OECD (which
advocates incorporating subjective well-being into policymaking)
recognizes, the current challenge is still collecting comparable and
meaningful subjective and objective data across countries.168 Advances in
the happiness economics literature will enable policymakers to measure
well-being (or at least sources of misery, such as unemployment, mental
illness, or inadequate health care).169 But the happiness literature currently
does not provide competition policymakers a comprehensive analytical
framework to reorient their legal standards toward promoting total wellbeing.
III. HOW THE HAPPINESS ECONOMICS LITERATURE
CAN INFORM COMPETITION POLICY
Although, as Part II discussed, the happiness literature does not provide
an analytical framework for analyzing routine antitrust issues, this does not
mean that competition officials should discount or ignore the literature
altogether. The findings of the happiness economics literature, as this Part
argues, offer some helpful insights on the current debate over antitrust’s
goals. The literature suggests that competition policy in a post-industrial
wealthy country would be more efficacious (in terms of increased wellbeing) in promoting economic, social, and democratic values, rather than
simply promoting a narrowly defined consumer welfare objective.
As Part III.A discusses, competition policy is not inherently limited to
one economic goal, such as maximizing consumer surplus. Competition
policy has historically sought to promote political, social, and moral values
of fair competition; dispersal of economic power; and individual autonomy.
Despite these historical concerns about concentrated economic power, some
U.S. courts and antitrust enforcers largely discounted or ignored these
noneconomic values. Americans, as Part III.B discusses, paid the price. But
even if the antitrust legal standards were recalibrated to promote consumer
166.
167.
168.
169.

KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 25, 97–105.
Harrison, supra note 13, at 2380.
OECD, supra note 17, at 279.
BOK, supra note 12, at 51.
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welfare by lowering prices and increasing consumer surplus, Part III.C
examines the benefits of a competition policy that seeks primarily to
increase consumer surplus in a post-industrial, post-materialist wealthy
society like the United States. Promoting this goal to the exclusion of other
traditional antitrust values would more likely decrease, rather than increase,
total well-being.
A. The Deemphasis of Competition Policy’s Noneconomic Goals
As this and earlier symposia reflect, competition policy is not inherently
confined to a single economic objective, such as maximizing consumer
welfare; total welfare; or allocative, productive, or dynamic efficiency.170
Although some seek to confine competition policy to a single objective,171
other competition officials, scholars, lawyers, and judges recognize
competition policy’s multiple economic, political, social, and moral
objectives.172 As Justice Brandeis observed:
There is a widespread belief that . . . by the control which the few have
exerted through giant corporations, individual initiative and effort are
170. See, e.g., Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2572–74 (2013) (discussing why democracy is good for antitrust);
see also Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on
Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965); Oliver E. Williamson, Symposium on Antitrust Law
and Economics, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 918 (1979).
171. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 29 (positing that the only goal of antitrust is to increase
consumer welfare, which is in reality total welfare); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) (efficiency is not only an important goal, it is the only goal
of antitrust law).
172. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 230–31
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Wald, J., concurring) (noting that the judge did not “believe that the debate
over the purposes of antitrust laws [was] settled yet” and thought “it premature to construct
an antitrust test that ignores all other potential concerns of the antitrust laws except for
restriction of output and price raising”); Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enters., Inc., 200
Cal. App. 3d 687, 709 n.11 (Ct. App. 1988) (observing that the “debate over the purposes of
the antitrust laws has generally acknowledged a balance of economic, social, and political
goals”); ICN REPORT, supra note 22; Stucke, Goals, supra note 8; William E. Kovacic,
Module 1: Origins and Aims of Competition Policy, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK
(May 2011), http://www.icnblog.org/ftc/ftc-1-module-4-28-11/player.html (discussing the
Sherman Act’s political and economic objectives); see also Robert Pitofsky, The Political
Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051–52 (1979) (“It is bad history, bad policy,
and bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws,” and any
antitrust policy that excluded such political values “would be unresponsive to the will of
Congress.”); Jed Rakoff, Lecture: Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes in an Age of
Economic Expertise, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 4, 9 (2012) (observing how antitrust
theorists are currently divided into “three warring camps”: “One camp thinks the most
important values that the antitrust laws are designed and should be interpreted to promote are
social or political values having to do with decentralizing economic power and equalizing
the distribution of wealth . . . . [T]he two other camps . . . are united in believing that the
only proper goals of antitrust law are economic . . . [but are divided between] a ‘Harvard
School,’ [which is] prone to find monopolistic practices, and a ‘Chicago School,’ which
believes the same practices to be for the most part procompetitive.”); Louis B. Schwartz,
“Justice” and Other Non-economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1076 (1979)
(“[P]utative economic gains should not be the exclusive or decisive factors in resolving
antitrust controversies.”).
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being paralyzed, creative power impaired and human happiness lessened;
that the true prosperity of our past came not from big business, but
through the courage, the energy and the resourcefulness of small men;
that only by releasing from corporate control the faculties of the unknown
many, only by the opening to them of the opportunities for leadership, can
confidence in our future be restored and the existing misery be overcome;
and that only through participation by the many in the responsibilities and
determinations of business, can Americans secure the moral and
intellectual development which is essential to the maintenance of
liberty.173

Among antitrust’s traditional aims are that (1) private economic power,
like all absolute power, is subject to abuse and injurious to public welfare
and our democratic ideals; (2) such power must be decentralized to protect a
free society from its abuse; (3) competitively structured markets diffuse
private power and discipline economic decision making; and
(4) competition policy is critical to preserving competitive markets.174
Competition policy, like our constitutional framework, sought to distribute
power, rather than to promote its consolidation or concentration.
Antitrust’s “political values,” Professor Pitofsky noted, were “first, a fear
that excessive concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic
political pressures, and second, a desire to enhance individual and business
freedom by reducing the range within which private discretion by a few in
the economic sphere controls the welfare of all.”175

173. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 580 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
174. See WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY,
LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 97–104 (2d ed. 2004); see also Atl.
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 360 n.19 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing some of the case law and scholarship referencing antitrust’s noneconomic goals);
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (Sherman Act is “the Magna
Carta of free enterprise”); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359
(1933) (Sherman Act as a “charter of freedom”); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945) (noting Congress’s desire to strengthen small business
concerns and to “put an end to great aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of
the individual before them”); JOSEPH W. BURNS, A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS: THEIR
ADMINISTRATION, INTERPRETATION AND EFFECT 341 (1958) (“Concern over excessive growth
of private economic power and its social and political implications is built into every
member of the structure of antitrust policy, including section 7.”); Harlan M. Blake &
William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422,
424 (1965); John Flynn & James Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of
Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of
Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125, 1137–41 (1987) (discussing the political, social,
and moral—as well as economic—goals motivating Congress in enacting antitrust
legislation); Milton Handler, Is Antitrust’s Centennial a Time for Obsequies or for Renewed
Faith in Its National Policy?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1933 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982).
175. Pitofsky, supra note 172, at 1051.
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This concern over concentrated economic power arose at our nation’s
founding,176 in the late 1800s when the Sherman Act was enacted,177 and
before and during World War II.178 As Senator Kefauver said,
I am not an alarmist, but the history of what has taken place in other
nations where mergers and concentrations have placed economic control
in the hands of a very few people is too clear to pass over easily. A point
is eventually reached, and we are rapidly reaching that point in this
country, where the public steps in to take over when concentration and
monopoly gain too much power. The taking over by the public through
its government always follows one or two methods and has one or two
political results. It either results in a Fascist state or the nationalization of
industries and thereafter a Socialist or Communist state.179

The Clayton Act is prophylactic in nature. In 1950, Congress amended
section 7 of the Clayton Act “to arrest the trend toward concentration, the
tendency to monopoly, before the consumer’s alternatives disappeared
through merger.”180 One purpose of section 7 and the Court’s presumption
was Congress’s premise that mergers tend to accelerate concentration in an
industry:
The use of these words [“may be”] means that the bill, if enacted, would
not apply to the mere possibility but only to the reasonable probability of
the [proscribed] effect. . . . The words ‘may be’ have been in section 7 of
176. Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 196 (1965); see also The SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 47 (1872).
177. As Senator Sherman said:
If the concentered powers of this combination are intrusted to a single man, it is a
kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government, and should be
subject to the strong resistance of the State and national authorities. If anything is
wrong this is wrong. If we will not endure a king as a political power we should
not endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the
necessaries of life.
21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890); see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
50 (1911); id. at 83–84 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting in part); Daniel R. Ernst, The
New Antitrust History, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 879, 882–83 (1990); Hofstadter, supra note
176, at 206–07; Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 96 (1982).
178. See WENDELL BERGE, CARTELS: CHALLENGE TO A FREE WORLD (1944); Wilhelm
Cohnstaedt, Germany’s Cartels and State Control: A Revealing Study of the Reich’s PostWar Industrial Monopoly Organizations, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1935, at BR9; John H.
Crider, Roosevelt Calls for Cartels Curb: In Letter to Hull He Says Types of “Trusts” Used
by Reich Must Be Ended, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1944, at 1.
179. 96 CONG. REC. 16,452 (1950).
180. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 (1963) (emphasis omitted); see
also United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 659 (1964); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962) (“[I]t is apparent that a keystone in the erection of a
barrier to what Congress saw was the rising tide of economic concentration, was its
provision of authority for arresting mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of
competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency.”). The DOJ, under its 1968
Merger Guidelines, also applied “an additional, stricter standard in determining whether to
challenge mergers occurring in any market, not wholly unconcentrated, in which there is a
significant trend toward increased concentration.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV.,
1968 GUIDELINES § 7 (1968), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.htm.
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the Clayton Act since 1914. The concept of reasonable probability
conveyed by these words is a necessary element in any statute which
seeks to arrest restraints of trade in their incipiency and before they
develop into full-fledged restraints violative of the Sherman Act. A
requirement of certainty and actuality of injury to competition is
incompatible with any effort to supplement the Sherman Act by reaching
incipient restraints.181

In response to Congressional concerns over the rising tide of economic
concentration in the U.S. economy, the Court applied a presumption. If
post-merger, the firm controls “an undue percentage share of the relevant
market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in
that market,” then the courts will presume that that merger “is so inherently
likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have
such anticompetitive effects.”182 In United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank, the Court did not attempt “to specify the smallest market share which
would still be considered to threaten undue concentration” but was “clear
that 30% presents that threat.”183 The Court, with its presumption, sought
to bring greater transparency and predictability to merger review, while
accommodating antitrust’s multiple concerns about concentrated economic
power.184
As Congress expressed and the Court operationalized in its presumption,
society often pays a price in permitting political and economic power to be
concentrated.185 Professor Williamson, in his famous trade-off calculus for
weighing the effects of economic concentration on total welfare, included in
his calculation the other social costs imposed or incurred by the monopolist
or cartel, such as the political implications of control over wealth, which he
observed are “a matter for serious concern.”186 With a powerful domestic
producer, for example, the government may be swayed to erect protectionist
Although the political implications may be beyond
measures.187
quantification, the issue, Williamson recognized, is nevertheless important
and cannot be ignored.188
Over the past thirty years, however, some federal courts and scholars
devalued Congress’s noneconomic concern over concentrated economic

181. S. REP. NO. 81-1775, at 6 (1950).
182. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
183. Id. at 364. The Court, in subsequent cases, lowered the presumption somewhat to
even 25 percent or less. United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461 (1964); United
States v Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 278, 280 (1964).
184. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 365.
185. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE
ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012).
186. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,
58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 24, 28–32 (1968).
187. See id. at 29; UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKBOOK, supra note 24, at 7–8.
188. See Williamson, supra note 186, at 29.
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power.189 Justice Stevens, for example, criticized the Court, “in its haste to
excuse illegal behavior in the name of efficiency,” of casting “aside a
century of understanding that our antitrust laws are designed to safeguard
more than efficiency and consumer welfare, and that private actions not
only compensate the injured, but also deter wrongdoers.”190
One reason why competition policy’s noneconomic goals declined in
importance was the courts’ and scholars’ embrace of the Chicago school’s
neoclassical economic theories, which offered “powerful simplifications,”
such as “rationality, profit maximization, [and] the downward sloping
demand curve.”191 With the Chicago school’s ascendency, the theory’s
flaws permeated competition policy.192 With certain physical sciences,
what is important is often measurable. One criticism of neoclassical
economic theory, however, is what is measurable becomes
disproportionately important.193 So those factors that are easier to assess
(such as the merger’s likely short-term impact on price, output, or
productive efficiency in narrowly defined markets) increase in importance.
Those factors that are harder to assess or measure (like the merger’s impact
on innovation, systemic risk, and its risks to democracy and individual
autonomy) are ignored or discounted.194 Policymakers, for example,
generally recognize dynamic efficiency as more important to economic
growth than productive efficiencies.195 But dynamic efficiency is harder to
189. Fayus Enters. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 602 F.3d 444, 453–54 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (observing
“a tension—and in federal antitrust law a radical change over time—between the goal of
increasing consumer welfare in the economic efficiency sense and contrasting goals such as
protecting small competitors or preventing the concentration of economic or political power
without regard to economic efficiency” and that it “is far from clear that state antitrust law
has, as a general matter, made the transition that has marked federal law”); Cieri v. Leticia
Query Realty, Inc., 905 P.2d 29, 35 n.10 (Haw. 1995) (“[T]here is little if anything in the
cases that suggests the courts have in fact been willing to pursue populist goals at the
expense of competition and efficiency. . . . If anything, they support the priority of
competition and its efficiency goals.” (quoting 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 103 (1978))).
190. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 360 (1990) (Stevens, J.
dissenting).
191. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 931 (1979); see also Darren Bush, Too Big To Bail: The Role of Antitrust in Distressed
Industries, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 277, 291–95 (2010).
192. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 44–45.
193. For a general criticism, see Friedrich A. Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge, Nobel
Memorial Lecture Delivered in Stockholm (Dec. 11, 1974), in THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 266
(Chaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984).
194. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision
Making: Antitrust As A Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 583 (1986) (“Contemporary
analysis routinely omits from the economic equation the soft data and the dynamic
implications that would, if accounted for, favor the entrepreneur. In particular, the model
omits the freedoms, the opportunities, the prospects for change, and the spur from the sense
of having a fair chance that comes from an environment hospitable to those without power.”
(footnotes omitted)); Williamson, supra note 186, at 23 (noting that a defect common to all
partial equilibrium constructions is its failure to examine interactions between sectors).
195. OECD, DYNAMIC EFFICIENCIES IN MERGER ANALYSIS 10 (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/40623561.pdf (“[I]nnovation is responsible for
most of the increase in material standards of living that has taken place since the industrial
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predict and quantify than productive efficiencies; thus, with some
exceptions, courts and agencies largely ignored the impact of mergers on
dynamic efficiency, focusing instead on a static price competition and
productive efficiencies.196
With the Chicago school’s rise in the late 1970s, some economists and
lawyers found it fashionable to dismiss antitrust’s historic concerns about
trends toward concentration and concentrated economic power.197 Before
the economic crisis, the conventional wisdom was that antitrust agencies
and courts could (and should) use concentration only as a screen: the
agencies would challenge only those few mergers that, under the prevailing
neoclassical economic thinking, would demonstrably lead to higher postmerger prices in narrowly defined markets.198 Although the Department of
Justice’s Antitrust Division (DOJ) at times argued the incipiency
standard,199 it inexplicably alleged in its complaints how the merger will
(rather than may) lessen price competition in narrowly defined markets.200
revolution. It seems likely that dynamic efficiencies have a considerably greater potential to
benefit consumers than static efficiencies have.”).
196. Id. at 9 (“Dynamic efficiencies pose an even greater measurement problem than
static efficiencies because dynamic effects will occur—if at all—over several time periods
and may be more abstract in nature than static effects. Courts have shown a tendency to
avoid delving into such exercises whenever possible.”); KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, REALITY
IGNORED: HOW MILTON FRIEDMAN AND CHICAGO ECONOMICS UNDERMINED AMERICAN
INSTITUTIONS AND ENDANGERED THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 85–86 (2011) (noting the
intellectual confinement of antitrust to static price competition when dynamic competition
provides the greater benefits).
197. The President of AAI described this trend. Symposium, Panel Discussion I:
Development of Bank Merger Law, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 511, 523 (2008) (Bert
Foer: “the modern era of merger policy began with the 1982 Merger Guidelines. The
current guidelines were issued jointly by the DOJ and the FTC in 1992 and revised a little bit
in 1997. They are limited to horizontal mergers—not vertical mergers, not conglomerate
mergers. Reflecting the influence of the Chicago School, they focus on market power as the
source of concern, and they don’t talk about trends of concentration, as Justice Brennan did,
or protection of small business, which was one of the objectives of some of the earlier
merger decisions.”).
198. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES 15 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
215247.pdf [hereinafter DOJ & FTC COMMENTARY ON GUIDELINES]. See generally First &
Waller, supra note 170, at 2551 (discussing the dramatic evolution of section 7); Lawrence
Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review: Stacking the Deck Against
Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159.
199. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law, United States v. Oracle Corp.,
331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C 04-0807), available at http://www.
justice.gov/atr/cases/f205300/205388.htm (“Congress used the words ‘may be substantially
to lessen competition’ . . . to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties.”
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962))). A plaintiff need not
show “even a high probability” that the proposed transaction will substantially lessen
competition. FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he statute
requires a prediction, and doubts are to be resolved against the transaction.”).
200. See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Humana Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00464 (D.D.C.
Mar. 27, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f281600/281618.pdf (“Unless
enjoined, Humana’s proposed acquisition of Arcadian will substantially lessen competition
in the sale of Medicare Advantage health insurance plans sold to Medicare-eligible
individuals . . . in forty-five counties and parishes in Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana,

2013] SHOULD COMPETITION POLICY PROMOTE HAPPINESS? 2609
One explanation is that courts, in accepting the Chicago school’s
ideologies, demanded more evidence from the antitrust plaintiffs to
overcome their belief of self-correcting markets.201 Plaintiffs had to
explain how, and the extent to which, the prices for one or both of the
merging firms’ products or services would increase post-merger, which in
turn led the agencies to calculate diversion ratios, the estimated consumer
demand at post-merger prices, and the profit margins of the merging
parties.202 As one antitrust official observed:
Judges are more accustomed to making decisions based on facts about
what happened; in mergers, they are called on to predict what might
happen in the future—something which I think a court is reluctant to do,
especially when faced with a merger that may involve many products,
only a small portion of which may be anticompetitive, and in the face of
local businessmen and women addressing all the advantages of the
merger, including claims of efficiencies.
More and more when we go to court, the judges seem to be asking for
concreteness; the anecdotal evidence seems less important to them than
surveys, which seem systematic, but may be flawed. If the issue is
product market, the courts seem to want to know exactly how many
customers would be willing to switch. And if it’s competitive effects,
they want to know how big an effect will result. More and more, in order
to persuade a court that a merger is going to be harmful, we feel the need
to do the best we can to quantify.

Oklahoma, and Texas”); Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, United States v. H&R Block, 833 F. Supp. 2d 36
(D.D.C. 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-00948), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f273600/
273683.pdf (“The United States brings this action to block an acquisition that will
substantially lessen competition in the tax preparation industry.”); Complaint, United States
v. Cingular Wireless Corp., No. 1:04CV01850 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f205900/205969.htm; Complaint, United States v. Northrop
Grumman Corp., No. 1:02CV02432 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2002), available at http://www.justice.
gov/atr/cases/f200500/200555.htm
(“Unless this transaction is blocked, Northrop’s
acquisition of TRW will substantially lessen competition in the development and production
of radar reconnaissance satellite systems and payloads and EO/IR reconnaissance satellite
systems and payloads used by the United States, and will likely lead to an increase in prices
and a reduction in quality and innovation for such satellites systems and payloads in
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18.”); Bernard M.
Hollander, Returning to the Proper Standard Under Section 7, AM. ANTITRUST INST. (April
5, 2010), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Hollander%20AAI%20piece_
040920101304.pdf.
201. See, e.g., First & Waller, supra note 170, at 2570–72 (discussing the agencies’ and
courts’ focus on error costs, with a greater concern over false positives than negatives).
202. See Rachel Brandenburger & Joseph Matelis, The 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger
Guidelines: A Historical and International Perspective, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.
justice.gov/atr/public/articles/280478.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); Carl Shapiro, The
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST
L.J. 701 (2010); see also DOJ & FTC COMMENTARY ON GUIDELINES, supra note 198, at 27
(“In all merger cases, the Agencies focus on the particular competitive relationship between
the merging firms, and for mergers involving differentiated products, the ‘diversion ratios’
between products combined by the merger are of particular importance.”).
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So, in our investigations and case preparations we are asking both our
economists and the parties what effects from the merger can be quantified
and how we can best do it.203

While some courts continued to cite the Philadelphia National Bank
presumption and the incipiency standard,204 many went further in requiring
the antitrust agencies to prove that a merger would cause prices to rise, and
to explain the chain of events that would lead to the post-merger price
increase (either unilateral or coordinated effects) and the price increase’s
likely magnitude.205 Requiring such certainty and actuality of injury to
competition are, of course, contrary to the statute’s plain language and its
effort to supplement the Sherman Act by reaching incipient restraints.
Nonetheless, the agencies’ merger review migrated toward assessing
what was measurable—namely short-term pricing effects under unilateral
effects theory and short-term productive efficiencies.206 As the agencies
and courts increasingly focused on the merger’s short-term impact on

203. Constance K. Robinson, Dir. of Operations, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div.,
Quantifying Unilateral Effects in Investigations and Cases Before the George Mason Law
Review Symposium—Antitrust in the Information Revolution: New Economic Approaches
for Analyzing Antitrust Issues (Oct. 11, 1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/speeches/1005.htm.
204. See Polypore Int’l, Inc. v. FTC, 686 F.3d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Six
W. Retail Acquisition, Inc. v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., 97 CIV. 5499 (DNE), 2000 WL
264295, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2000) (“More alarming to this Court, though, is the
vertical unification that the LCE merger caused between powerful distributors and
exhibitors. The Supreme Court warned that an important factor for a court to consider when
assaying the legality of a merger is ‘the trend toward concentration in the industry.’”
(quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 332)).
205. See, e.g., United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1165 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (misconstruing the Clayton Act’s incipiency standard, the trial court held that
“[w]ithout the benefit of presumptions, the burden remains upon plaintiffs to come forward
with evidence of actual anticompetitive effects”); FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d
109, 115 (D.D.C. 2004) (“To warrant injunctive relief under the Clayton Act, the challenged
acquisition must be likely substantially to lessen competition. Although certainty is not
required, Section 7 does demand that a plaintiff demonstrate that the substantial lessening of
competition will be ‘sufficiently probable and imminent’ to warrant relief.” (citation
omitted)), dismissed, 04-5291, 2004 WL 2066879 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2004).
206. Charles A. James, Asst. Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Rediscovering Coordinated Effects, Address at the American Bar Association Annual
Meeting, Section of Antitrust Law 7–8 (Aug. 13, 2002), available at http://www.
justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200124.pdf (noting that “one interesting side-effect of the
1992 Guidelines has been the emergence of unilateral effects as the predominant theory of
economic harm pursued in government merger investigations and challenges.”); Coordinated
Effects Analysis: The Arch Coal Decision, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Mar. 2005), http://www.
crai.com/uploadedFiles/RELATING_MATERIALS/Publications/Consultant_publications/D
ick/files/Coordinated%20Effects%20Analysis%20-%20The%20Arch%20Coal%20Decision
.pdf (quoting one former DOJ economist: “Following the adoption of the 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, coordinated effects analysis languished as an active instrument of merger
review and enforcement. Over the last decade, mergers were much more likely to be
reviewed (or challenged) on the basis of unilateral effects concerns. More often than not,
when a merger complaint included a coordinated effects allegation, it had the flavor, if not
the reality, of being an afterthought.”).
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prices, other important concerns (such as dynamic efficiencies and systemic
risk) were simply ignored.207
Consequently, federal competition policy underwent a dramatic shift
from 1960 to the policies we have today. One positive development is that
mergers’ likely efficiencies, once viewed with suspicion, were seen as a
benefit.
But while competition policy historically distrusted the
concentration of economic power and saw the importance of small
companies in promoting dynamic efficiencies, the Court recently praised
monopolies.208 Courts and agencies “no longer concern[ed] themselves
with preventing bigness, and indeed tend[ed] instead to encourage largescale enterprise for efficiency’s sake.”209 Courts and antitrust agencies
generally applied a light touch to merger review under a fear of false
positives and a belief that many mergers promote efficiencies, even though
the empirical literature suggests the contrary.210 While the efficiencies
defense developed over the past thirty years, antitrust enforcers and courts
did not account for post-merger inefficiencies or competitive distortions in
creating firms too big and too integral to fail.211 As Professor Fox argues,
“by trusting dominant firm strategies and leading firm collaborations to
produce efficiency, modern U.S. antitrust protects monopoly and oligopoly,
suppresses innovative challenges, and stifles efficiency.”212
This change in competition policy did not arise from congressional
amendment. Instead, it came mostly from judges and political appointees.
Although the political, social, and moral implications of concentrated
economic power may be beyond quantification, Congress emphasized these
concerns, and the Court once strived for simpler antitrust rules to arrest any
trend toward concentration in its incipiency.213 But aside from a few media
207. Maurice E. Stucke, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 313
(2010).
208. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
412 (2004); Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 497 (criticizing the Court’s assumptions in Trinko).
209. Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Lessons for Competition Law from the Economic Crisis:
The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the “Too-Big-To-Fail” Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 264 (2011).
210. See Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J.
1527, 1560–61 (2011); OECD, Mergers and Dynamic Efficiencies, POLICY BRIEF, 6 (Sept.
2008), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/48/41359037.pdf.
211. Markham, supra note 209, at 314.
212. Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT
THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 77, 77
(Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
213. Despite the promise of better, more objective analysis, the economic welfare goals
did not provide greater objectivity, transparency, administrability, and predictability to
antitrust’s rule of reason standard. The rule of reason has been routinely pilloried. In the
past decade, the Supreme Court has also complained about the state of federal antitrust law
(e.g., the interminable litigation, inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase, and its
fear over the unusually high risk of inconsistent results by antitrust courts). But it was the
Court that has created this predicament. Over the past thirty years, the Court increasingly
relied on its fact-specific weighing standard, the rule of reason, and a vague economic goal
(consumer welfare) that accommodated different personal values and interpretation and often
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mergers where the FCC haphazardly sought to promote noneconomic
political and social values, U.S. merger policy over the past thirty years
largely ignored competition policy’s noneconomic values.214
B. Reconciling the Consumer Welfare Standard
and the Welfare of Consumers Currently
As Part III.A discussed, competition policy’s noneconomic goals were
deemphasized over the past thirty years in the pursuit of an unclear
economic objective of promoting consumer welfare. As I discuss
elsewhere, consumer welfare cannot be antitrust’s sole or even primary
objective.215 But this Part puts aside consumer welfare’s infirmities, and
asks whether competition policy over the past thirty years indeed promoted
consumers’ welfare. Given antitrust’s broad applicability and the federal
courts’ free reign under the Court’s rule of reason standard in construing the
competition laws, has consumer welfare increased?
The best way to answer this is to compare consumers’ welfare today with
that in the counterfactual world where competition policy promoted
multiple objectives. Regrettably we cannot correct the policy failures over
the past thirty years. Only rough proxies, such as examining various
metrics of consumer well-being over time, are available.
Most Americans fortunately do not face hunger216 or homelessness.217
One of the few well-being metrics where America excels is the average
material well-being. The average household disposable income in the
pointed to no particular course of action. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason
Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009).
214. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 128–29; Bush, supra note 191, at 279; Maurice E. Stucke
& Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249 (2001);
Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Toward a Better Competition Policy for the Media:
The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies That Support the Media Sector’s Unique
Role in Our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REV. 101 (2009).
215. For one, no consensus exists in defining or measuring consumer welfare or
designing legal standards to further this goal. Stucke, Goals, supra note 8, at 574; see also
Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253 (2013) (noting how
the term has no particular meaning). For another, a consumer welfare objective cannot
explain antitrust enforcement against buyer cartels or monopsonies without downstream
effects on consumers. Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror,
62 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2094553. If
promoting consumer surplus is the sole goal, then consumers arguably could collude to
depress prices for goods and services (such as rigging bids at home foreclosure sales). Such
conduct is illegal.
216. The percentage of American households that had access to enough food for an
active, healthy lifestyle ranged between 89 percent (2005) and 85.3 percent (2009). U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, tbl.214, available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0214.pdf. The percentage of
households having difficulty meeting basic food needs ranged between 6.9 percent (2005)
and 9 percent (2009). Id.
217. NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, THE STATE OF HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA
2012 (2012), available at http://www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/the-state-ofhomelessness-in-america-2012 (estimating that the U.S. homeless population “decreased 1
percent, or by about 7,000 people . . . from 643,067 in 2009 to 636,017 in 2011”).
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United States in 2008 was $37,690 per year, and the average U.S.
household’s financial worth was an estimated $98,440, which were much
higher than the OECD averages, $22,284 and $36,808, respectively.218
Updating for the Great Recession, the median U.S. household income in
2011 was $50,054.219
Americans’ discretionary income increased, as the percentage of
expenditures allocated for food, clothing, and housing declined:
In 1901, the average U.S. family devoted 79.8 percent of its spending to
these necessities, while families in New York City spent 80.3 percent, and
families in Boston allocated 86.0 percent. By 2002–03, allocations on
necessities had been reduced substantially, for U.S. families to 50.1
percent of spending, for New York City families to 56.7 percent, and for
Boston families to 53.8 percent.220

On the other hand, the U.S. economy over the past thirty years has failed
for many Americans in terms of openness, inclusiveness, positive economic
impact, and sustainable development.221 Dated policy paradigms presumed
trade-offs between economic efficiency and social progress.222 Companies
overlooked the “well-being of their customers, the depletion of natural
resources vital to their businesses, the viability of key suppliers, [and] the
economic distress of the communities in which they produce and sell.”223
1. The Widening Inequality Gap and Declining Social Mobility
A competition policy’s consumer welfare standard in theory should
inhibit the transfer of wealth from consumers to firms with significant
market power. Income and wealth inequality, however, have increased
significantly over the past thirty years.224 Wealth inequality was a historic
218. United States, OECD BETTER LIFE INITIATIVE, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/
countries/united-states/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
219. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, P60–243, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2011, at 5 (2012) [hereinafter 2011 CENSUS], available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf.
220. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 100 YEARS OF U.S.
CONSUMER SPENDING DATA FOR THE NATION, NEW YORK CITY, AND BOSTON 66 (2006),
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/uscs/report991.pdf.
221. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at xii.
222. Porter & Kramer, supra note 1, at 64.
223. Id.
224. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 6 (EPI Digital, 12th ed.
2012), available at http://stateofworkingamerica.org/subjects/overview/?reader (observing
that wages earned by the top 1 percent “grew about 156 percent between 1979 and 2007,
whereas wages for the bottom 90 percent rose by less than 17 percent”). Economists have
documented the distinctive U-shaped pattern of income disparity between 1917 and 2007.
Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States
(updated with 2011 estimates), BERKELEY (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.econ.berkeley.
edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2011.pdf.
Peaking in 1928, income disparity sharply
declined during the Great Depression. Thereafter, “[b]etween 1947 and 1973, economic
growth was both rapid and distributed equally across income classes.” Econ. Pol’y Inst.,
Income Inequality, ST. WORKING AM., http://stateofworkingamerica.org/inequality/income-
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antitrust concern. Senator Sherman, in support of his legislation, identified
the inequality of condition, wealth, and opportunity as the greatest threat to
social order, and stated that this inequality “has grown within a single
generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combinations to
control production and trade and to break down competition.”225 But
income inequality, The Economist recently described in its special report, is
“on a scale that matches, or even exceeds, the first Gilded Age.”226
Wealth and income inequality in the United States is approaching levels
seen in plutocracies.227 The OECD notes:
The wealthiest Americans have collected the bulk of the past three
decades’ income gains. The share of national income of the richest 1%
more than doubled between 1980 and 2008 . . . [while] the top marginal
income tax rate dropped from 70% in 1981 to 35% in 2010.228

In 2010, the United States had “the fourth highest rate of income inequality
and relative poverty (17.3% of people [are] poor compared to an OECD
average of 11.1%) in the OECD.”229 Although the disparity between the
rich and poor widened globally,230 the OECD observed, “nowhere has this
trend been so stark as in the United States.”231 Income inequality increased
during the Obama Administration—growing 1.6 percent in one year alone
(between 2010 and 2011),232 and 5.2 percent since 1993.233
Similarly, wealth inequality is at a record high.234 In 1962, “the
wealthiest 1% of households averaged 125 times the wealth of the median
inequality/. “The poorest 20% of families saw growth at least as fast as the richest 20% of
families, and everybody in between experienced similar rates of income growth.” Id. But in
the late 1970s, income inequality in the United States began growing, reaching a record high
in 2007. Anthony B. Atkinson et al., Top Incomes in the Long Run of History, 49 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 3, 6 (2011) (noting how the share of total pre-tax income going to the top decile
income group reached almost 50 percent by 2007, the highest level on record, with a
significant change in the top one percentile, which rose from 8.9 percent of total pre-tax
income in 1976 to 23.5 percent in 2007).
225. 21 CONG. REC. 2454, 2460 (1890).
226. Special Report: For Richer, For Poorer, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2012, at 2
[hereinafter Special Report].
227. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 22.
228. OECD, Country Note: United States, in DIVIDED WE STAND: WHY INEQUALITY
KEEPS RISING (2011), available at www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/49170253.pdf.
229. OECD, Key Findings: United States, in SOCIETY AT A GLANCE—OECD SOCIAL
INDICATORS (2011), available at www.oecd.org/social/socialpoliciesanddata/47573390.pdf.
230. Angel Gurría, OECD Sec’y Gen., Remarks at Press Conf. for Divided We Stand:
Inequality Keeps Rising (Dec. 5, 2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/social/divided
westandwhyinequalitykeepsrisingspeech.htm (“Income inequality in OECD countries is at
its highest level for the past half century.”).
231. OECD, Country Note:
United States, in GROWING UNEQUAL?: INCOME
DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY IN OECD COUNTRIES 1 (2008), available at http://www.oecd
.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/41528678.pdf.
232. 2011 CENSUS, supra note 219, at 7, 8 (Gini index increasing from 0.470 to 0.477);
Special Report, supra note 226, at 8 (more than 90 percent of all income gains since the
recession went to the top 1 percent).
233. 2011 CENSUS, supra note 219, at 10.
234. SYLVIA A. ALLEGRETTO, ECON. POLICY INST., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA’S
WEALTH, 2011, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.epi.org/page/-/BriefingPaper292.pdf.
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household.”235 By 2009, the wealth disparity nearly doubled as “the
wealthiest 1% of households averaged 225 times the wealth of the median
household.”236 Indeed, all households—except those in the top 5 percent—
saw a relative decline in share of overall wealth between 1962 and 2009.237
In 2009, the richest 20 percent of American households accumulated 87.2
percent of household net wealth, the remaining 80 percent of American
households accounted for 12.8 percent of all wealth, and approximately one
in every four American households had no (or a negative) net worth.238
A bigger issue is fairness. Contrary to this Horatio Alger myth, income
mobility is lower (and income inequality greater) in America than in many
European239 and other developed countries.240 One 2008 study found that
“Americans do not have an equal shot at getting ahead, and one’s chances
are largely dependent on one’s parents’ economic position.”241 The study
noted that “[c]hildren born to parents in the top quintile have the highest
likelihood of attaining the top, and children born to parents in the bottom
quintile have the highest likelihood of being in the bottom themselves.”242
Along with increasing income inequality came poverty.243 Many more
Americans are impoverished.244 In 2010, over 46 million people were in
poverty, “the largest number in the 52 years for which poverty estimates
235. Id. at 7.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 5.
238. Id. at 2. Median wealth for African-American households saw an even greater
decline in both absolute dollars ($4,890 in 2010 versus $6,366 in 1983) and relative to white
households ($97,000 in 2010). MISHEL ET AL., supra note 224, at 40–41.
239. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 18; Like Father, Not Like Son, in Special Report, supra
note 226, at 7.
240. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 224, at 33–35; Miles Corak, Do Poor Children Become
Poor Adults? Lessons from a Cross Country Comparison of Generational Earnings Mobility
(Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 1993, 2006), available at
http://ftp.iza.org/dp1993.pdf; Markus Jäntti et al., American Exceptionalism in a New Light:
A Comparison of Intergenerational Earnings Mobility in the Nordic Countries, the United
Kingdom and the United States 27 (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No.
1938, 2006), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp1938.pdf; OECD, ARE WE GROWING
UNEQUAL? 7 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/56/41494435.pdf
(“Taking the analysis of persistence of income poverty and mobility of earnings between
generations together suggests that more unequal countries are prone to developing an
‘underclass’ who are poor themselves for long periods and so are their children.”).
241. Julia B. Isaacs, BROOKINGS INST., Economic Mobility of Families Across
Generations, in GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 15–
19 (2008).
242. Id.; see also MISHEL ET AL., supra note 224, at 34 (measuring the intergenerational
elasticity between parental income and 40-to-44-year-old sons’ earning as declining from
0.40 in 1950 to 0.32 in 1980, and increasing to 0.46 in 1990 and 0.58 in 2000).
243. 2011 CENSUS, supra note 219, at 13, fig.4 (showing sharp inclines in the number of
people living in poverty between the late 1970s and 1984, 1989 and 1993, and 2000 and
2010). The percentage of U.S. families below poverty declined from 20.8 percent in 1959 to
9.7 percent in 1973. Id. at 13. It fluctuated between 9.9 percent and 10.9 percent between
1974 and 1979, and grew from 11.5 percent (1980) to 13.9 percent (1983). Id.
244. Id. at 13 (noting that the official poverty rate in 2011 was 15 percent (46.2 million
people)). For African Americans and Hispanics, the 2011 poverty rates were 27.6 percent
and 25.3 percent. Id. at 15.
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have been published.”245 In 2010, 20.5 million people (6.7 percent of the
U.S. population) “lived below half of the poverty line (below $11,157 for a
family of four)”—the highest level on record.246
This might have come as a shock to some, but not to many middle and
lower income households. Well before 2008, middle-class Americans saw
little gains in income despite gains in productivity.247 Unlike the period
between WWII and the 1970s, between 1979 and 2011, wages and
productivity did not increase in tandem.248 Real median household income
stagnated in the 2000s, with the 2011 median 8.9 percent below the 1999
median.249 When mass unemployment came, the middle class shrank
further.250 Neighborhoods over the past thirty years have become more
segregated by income.251
245. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, P60-239, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2010, at 14 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/
incpovhlth/2010/index.html.
246. Danilo Trisi et al., Poverty Rate Second-Highest in 45 Years, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Sept. 14, 2011), www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3580.
247. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 3, 8; Atkinson, supra note 224, at 8 (noting how “U.S. real
income per family grew at a modest 1.2 percent annual rate from 1976 to 2007” but “when
excluding the top 1 percent, the average real income of the bottom 99 percent grew at an
annual rate of only 0.6 percent, which implies that the top 1 percent captured 58 percent of
real economic growth per family during that period”).
248. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 224, at 7 (“[P]roductivity—the ability to produce more
goods and services per hour worked—grew 69.2 percent, while median hourly compensation
(wages and benefits) grew just 7.0 percent.”).
249. 2011 CENSUS, supra note 219, at 5; see also DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 245,
at 5. The median household incomes declined for whites, African Americans, Hispanics,
and Asians. Wages, ST. WORKING AM., http://stateofworkingamerica.org/files/book/
factsheets/wages.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (“Both high school—and college-educated
workers have seen no growth in their hourly compensation in the last 10 years, starting in
2002. College graduates up to the 70th percentile have had stagnant or falling wages since
2000, and wages have failed to improve for college graduates in nearly every occupation,
including business occupations.”).
250. D’Vera Cohn, Middle-Income Economics and Middle-Class Attitudes, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/22/the-lostdecade-of-the-middle-class-2/ (“[B]ased on data going back to 1970, households in the
nation’s upper-income tier now take in a larger share of the nation’s aggregate households
income than they used to, while the shares for the middle-income and lower-income tiers
have declined. One reason for this trend is that upper-income households have made larger
income gains than other households over recent decades. In addition, the share of adults who
are in the middle-income tier (defined as living in households with two-thirds to double the
national median income) has shrunk in recent decades: 51% of adults resided in such
households in 2010, compared with 61% in 1970.”); Marisol Bello & Paul Overberg, Middle
Class’ Share of the Nation’s Income Is Shrinking, USA TODAY (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.
usatoday.com/money/economy/story/2011-10-25/middle-class-disappearing/50914822/1; see
also SEAN F. REARDON & KENDRA BISCHOFF, US2010 PROJECT, GROWTH IN THE RESIDENTIAL
SEGREGATION OF FAMILIES BY INCOME, 1970–2009 (Nov. 2011), available at http://graphics
8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/RussellSageIncomeSegregationreport.pdf (discussing
the shrinking middle class and economically mixed neighborhoods).
251. MURRAY, supra note 113, at 69–99; Special Report, supra note 226, at 12; Richard
Fry & Paul Taylor, The Rise of Residential Segregation by Income, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/01/the-rise-of-residentialsegregation-by-income/.
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This widening inequality gap and declining social mobility raise other
concerns, including slower economic growth, greater inefficiency from
rent-seeking, weaker demand, limited opportunity for many people, and
more financial crises.252
2. America’s Threadbare Social Net
Besides exposing the widening gap between the wealthiest 1 percent and
the rest of America, the economic crisis exposed America’s threadbare
social net.253 America’s infrastructure is crumbling.254 Primary and
secondary education for many families is inadequate.255 Incarcerations,256
home foreclosures,257 underwater mortgages,258 and the public’s
252. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 83–117; Special Report, supra note 226, at 6, 20.
253. See STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 10–12; SEN. BERNIE SANDERS, THE SPEECH: A
HISTORIC FILIBUSTER ON CORPORATE GREED AND THE DECLINE OF OUR MIDDLE CLASS 72–73
(2011); Special Report, supra note 226, at 10 (noting that social spending while increasing
has become less redistributive; whereas in 1979 over half of all federal social spending went
to the poorest fifth of households, today it is only 36 percent).
254. ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, THIRD WORLD AMERICA: HOW OUR POLITICIANS ARE
ABANDONING THE MIDDLE CLASS AND BETRAYING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2011); Special
Report, supra note 226, at 40–41, 129–35, 236; see also AM. SOC’Y CIVIL ENG’RS. 2009
REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE (2009), http://www.infrastructurereport
card.org/.
255. OECD, LESSONS FROM PISA FOR THE UNITED STATES, STRONG PERFORMERS AND
SUCCESSFUL REFORMERS IN EDUCATION 34 (2011), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789264096660-en (finding that “socio-economic disadvantage has a particularly strong
impact on student performance in the United States: 17% of the variation in student
performance in the United States is explained by students’ socio-economic background,”
which is significantly higher than the 9 percent in Canada or Japan: “In other words, in the
United States, two students from a different socio-economic background vary much more in
their learning outcomes than is normally the case in OECD countries.”); SANDERS, supra
note 253, at 136–42; Martha J. Bailey & Susan M. Dynarski, Gains and Gaps: Changing
Inequality in U.S. College Entry and Completion 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 17633, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17633 (finding,
from nearly seventy years of U.S. Census data, a growing gap between children from highand low-income families in college entry, persistence, and graduation).
256. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 15; ACLU, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND
MASS INCARCERATION (2011), http://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/banking-bondageprivate-prisons-and-mass-incarceration (“The United States imprisons more people—both
per capita and in absolute terms—than any other nation in the world, including Russia,
China, and Iran.”).
257. ALLEGRETTO, supra note 234, at 30–31; Kara Bloomgarden-Smoke, What’s Next for
Occupy Wall Street? Activists Target Foreclosure Crisis, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 29,
2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2012/0129/What-s-next-for-Occupy-Wall-StreetActivists-target-foreclosure-crisis; Alejandro Lazo, Fewer People Falling Behind on
Mortgages, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/18/business/lafi-foreclosures-20110218.
258. ALLEGRETTO, supra note 234, at 29–30; Paul Owers, South Florida Housing Market
Stabilizing, Zillow Says, SUNSENTINEL.COM (Aug. 9, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://weblogs.sunsentinel.com/business/realestate/housekeys/blog/2011/08/south_florida_housing_market_s.ht
ml (“46 percent of homes with a mortgage in the three counties are ‘underwater’—worth less
than what’s owed . . . . Nationally, about 27 percent of homes with mortgages are
underwater.”); The American Cities Sunk by Underwater Mortgages, 24/7 WALL ST. (Oct.
28, 2011, 3:38 AM), http://247wallst.com/2011/10/28/the-american-cities-sunk-by-under
water-mortgages/.
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dissatisfaction with Congress reached record highs.259 With America’s debt
in the trillions of dollars,260 a larger fiscal crisis looms.
My point is not that America’s feeble antitrust enforcement primarily
caused the current economic blight. Not every harm to consumers stems
from an injury to competition that the competition laws redress. Others,
like Joseph Stiglitz, have argued that the plight of the middle class and
poor, the growing income and wealth inequality, and the widening gap
between worker pay and increases in productivity were caused in part by
our failed competition policies.261 My point here is that, over the past thirty
years, it is hard to see how antitrust’s consumer welfare objective actually
promoted the welfare of 99 percent of Americans.
3. Concerns Over Crony Capitalism
Like the concern preceding the Sherman Act’s enactment in 1890, the
concern today is the alignment between big government and big business,
and how federal policies are skewed toward helping the wealthy and
powerful.262 As Stiglitz recently argued,
We haven’t achieved the minimalist state that libertarians advocate. What
we’ve achieved is a state too constrained to provide the public goods—
investments in infrastructure, technology, and education—that would
make for a vibrant economy and too weak to engage in the redistribution
that is needed to create a fair society. But we have a state that is still large
259. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, FRUSTRATION WITH CONGRESS
COULD HURT REPUBLICAN INCUMBENTS—GOP BASE CRITICAL OF PARTY’S WASHINGTON
LEADERSHIP 1 (2011) [hereinafter FRUSTRATION WITH CONGRESS], available at http://www.
people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/12-15-11%20Congress%20and%20Economy%20release
.pdf.
260. U.S. NAT’L DEBT CLOCK, http://www.usdebtclock.org/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
261. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 41–51, 82 (arguing that “inequality is not just the result of
the forces of nature, of abstract market forces” but “to a very large extent, the result of
government policies that shape and direct the forces of technology and markets and broader
societal forces”); see also F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 679–82 (3d ed. 1990); William S. Comanor & Robert H.
Smiley, Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth, 89 Q.J. ECON. 177, 193 (1975) (finding,
in 1962, when wealth inequality was less severe, monopolies had a major effect on the
relative wealth holdings of the wealthiest, those with household net worth exceeding a half
million dollars); cf. Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition
and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1977) (recognizing that
“[a]ntitrust actions may not always improve both income distribution and efficiency” but in
“most circumstances . . . antitrust gives the efficiency-equality tradeoff the characteristic of
having one’s cake and eating it too” because in “the long run, more competition will mean
less accumulation of wealth from capitalized monopoly positions”). To be fair, Elzinga felt
that “the pursuit of egalitarian income distribution through antitrust enforcement is likely to
have limited results.” Id. at 1196.
262. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at xix–xx; SANDERS, supra note 253, at 23–24; see also
FRUSTRATION WITH CONGRESS, supra note 259 (“A 61% majority say the economic system in
this country unfairly favors the wealthy, while 36% say it is generally fair to most
Americans. And fully 77% say that a few rich people and corporations have too much
power in this country. While still a minority view, the current survey finds 40% saying that
hard work and determination are no guarantee of success, higher than in any other survey
conducted over the past 17 years.”).
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enough and distorted enough that it can provide a bounty of gifts to the
wealthy.263

Many Americans in recent surveys were dissatisfied with the federal
government,264 its size and power,265 the country’s moral and ethical
climate,266 and the state of America’s economy.267 Many distrust the
federal government268 and big business.269 Many believe there is “too
much power in the hands of a few rich people and large corporations in the
United States.”270 Many “say the economic system in this country unfairly
favors the wealthy.”271 Many feel that the federal economic policies since
2008 have favored—either a great deal or a fair amount—large banks and
financial institutions (74% surveyed), large corporations (70%), and the
wealthy (57%), while not favoring the poor (31%), the middle class (27%),
or small businesses (23%).272 Many believe the tax system favors the
rich.273 Some wealthy taxpayers are also dissatisfied with the tax
inequities.274 One concern is that
263. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 155.
264. In 2011, when asked to describe their feelings about the federal government, only
about one in ten Americans (11%) “say they are basically content with the federal
government, by far the lowest percentage in a measure that dates to 1997.” Most were either
frustrated (60%) or angry (26%) with the federal government. Public Satisfaction with
Government Hits Low; Anger Rises, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/public-satisfaction-with-govern
ment-hits-low-anger-rises/ [hereinafter Public Satisfaction Hits Low].
265. Lydia Saad, U.S. Economy Most Toxic of 24 Issues, GALLUP (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/152129/Economy-Toxic-Issues.aspx (69 percent surveyed).
266. Id. (68 percent surveyed).
267. Id. (69 percent surveyed).
268. In 2011, “80% say they trust the government to do what is right only some of the
time or never. Just 19% say the government can be trusted just about always or most of the
time.” Public Satisfaction Hits Low, supra note 264 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
contrast, when this question was first asked in 1958, “nearly three-quarters (73%) of
Americans said they always or mostly trusted the government to do what is right.” Id.
269. In 2011, only 38 percent felt favorably toward business corporations, and 41 percent
felt favorably about labor unions. Id. Between early 2007 and 2011, the favorability ratings
for business corporations and unions fell by 10 and 13 points, respectively. PEW RESEARCH
CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, LABOR UNIONS SEEN AS GOOD FOR WORKERS, NOT U.S.
COMPETITIVENESS: UNIONS’ FAVORABILITY STILL LOW, BUT MIRRORS BUSINESS RATING 1
(2011), available at http://www.people-press.org/2011/02/17/labor-unions-seen-as-good-forworkers-not-u-s-competitiveness/. Opinions about business corporations turned more
negative among Republicans (58 percent viewing corporations favorably and 36 percent
unfavorably in February 2011 versus 70 percent in January 2007 viewing corporations
favorably and 18 percent unfavorably). Id.
270. Andrew Kohut, Op-Ed., Don’t Mind the Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012, at A27.
271. Id. (61 percent of those surveyed).
272. Gov’t Economic Policies Seen As Boon for Banks and Big Business, Not Middle
Class or Poor, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (July 19, 2010),
http://www.people-press.org/2010/07/19/govt-economic-policies-seen-as-boon-for-banksand-big-business-not-middle-class-or-poor/ (“Fully 74% say that government policies over
the past two years have done a great deal (53%) or a fair amount (21%) to help large banks
and financial institutions. Majorities also say that large corporations (70% great deal/fair
amount) and wealthy people (57% great deal/fair amount) have been helped.”).
273. Kohut, supra note 270. As to how the tax rates benefitted the rich, see SANDERS,
supra note 253, at 26–27, 45–46, 75–76, 97 (“The wealthiest 400 Americans now earn an
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the current imbalance of power between mega-corporations and all other
institutions and individuals in the world constitutes a danger to peace,
health and prosperity. While the protesters in the Middle East rebel
against powerful repressive governments, participants in the Occupy Wall
Street protests share a perspective that a relatively small group of
corporate and wealthy individuals now wield too much economic
influence and control in the United States and the world.275

Many supported the Occupy Wall Street movement.276 Over four
hundred economists supported Occupy Wall Street in “liberat[ing] the
economy from the short-term greed of the rich and powerful one
percent.”277 Students are questioning a conservative bias in economics
itself.278 As economist Robert J. Shiller observes, “I teach financial
markets, and it’s a little like teaching R.O.T.C. during the Vietnam War. . . .
You have this sense that something’s amiss.”279
4. Dissatisfaction with Competition Policy
Professor Pitofsky presciently warned in 1979 that,
if the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop under
antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the likely result
will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate giants that it will be
impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive role in economic
affairs.280

One need only look at the financial services industry to see his prediction
bear out.281 The taxpayer bailouts of the major financial institutions,
automobile manufacturers, AIG, and other large corporations exposed how
average of $345 million a year and pay an effective tax rate of 16.6 percent, on average.
That is the lowest tax rate for wealthy individuals on record.”); Special Report, supra note
226, at 9 (“[M]ore than 60% of all tax preferences flow to the wealthiest 20% of Americans,
with only 3% going to the bottom quintile.”); see also STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 71–74.
274. James B. Stewart, Think Your Tax Rate Is High? Many Complain of the I.R.S. Bite,
but This One Stands Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012, at B1.
275. Scott T. Meier, Imbalance of Power Imperils Prosperity, BUFF. NEWS, Dec. 12,
2011, 2011 WLNR 25619974; see also DAVID ROTHKOPF, SUPERCLASS: THE GLOBAL POWER
ELITE AND THE WORLD THEY ARE MAKING (2008).
276. Matthew Cooper, Poll: Most Americans Support Occupy Wall Street, ATLANTIC,
Oct. 19, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/10/poll-most-americanssupport-occupy-wall-street/246963/.
277. Statement on OWS, ECON4, http://econ4.org/statement-on-ows (last visited Mar. 19,
2013).
278. See, e.g., Jose A. DelReal, Students Walk Out of Ec 10 in Solidarity with “Occupy,”
HARV. CRIMSON (last updated Nov. 3, 2011, 4:04 AM), http://www.thecrimson.harvard.
edu/article/2011/11/2/mankiw-walkout-economics-10/.
279. Kevin Roose, Investment Banking at Top Colleges, Anti–Wall St. Fervor
Complicates Recruiting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/
11/28/at-top-colleges-anti-wall-st-fervor-complicates-recruiting/ (quoting Robert J. Shiller)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
280. Pitofsky, supra note 172, at 1051.
281. Markham, supra note 209, at 313 (discussing how antitrust neither prevented nor
redressed the recent systemic threats caused directly by companies too big and integral to the
functioning of markets).
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the economically powerful have every desire to use the government to
protect their economic interests.282
For many, the economic crisis exposed the relationship between the big
financial firms and big government.283 A 2012 study found that, “[a]mong
the middle class, about six-in-ten (62%) blame lawmakers ‘a lot’ for the
problems of the middle class. Somewhat smaller shares blame banks and
financial institutions (54%) and large corporations (47%).”284 Fifty-six
percent of surveyed Americans said that the power and influence of banks
and other financial institutions represented a major threat to the country.285
This was not always the case. With an emphasis on structural banking
regulations and antitrust merger review,286 the Supreme Court in the 1960s
celebrated the federal supervision of banking as one of the most, if not the
most, successful systems of economic regulation.287 Commercial banking
at that time was diffused through many independent, local banks, rather
than concentrated in a few nationwide banks, as in England and
Germany.288 Commercial banking was subject to various state and federal
governmental controls.289 Add to that antitrust merger review, which,
consistent with the Clayton Act’s legislative political and social values,
sought to arrest anticompetitive tendencies and trends toward concentration
in their incipiency.290 In fact, in 1963, the Court noted the “virtual
disappearance of bank failures from the American economic scene.”291
But that changed in the 1980s. With lax merger review and banking
deregulation, beginning in the 1980s, the financial services industry
underwent a wave of record-setting megamergers.292 Around 400 to 500
282. Frank Pasquale, The Conservatism of Occupy Wall Street, CONCURRING OPINIONS
(Oct. 27, 2011, 10:37 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/10/theconservatism-of-occupy-wall- street.html.
283. Special Report, supra note 226, at 15 (describing concerns over the cronyism
between Wall Street and Washington, D.C. over the past thirty years that allowed financiers
to tilt rules in their favor and how “[t]he finance industry (along with property and
insurance) employs more lobbyists than virtually any other industry, around four per
Congressman”).
284. Fewer, Poorer, Gloomier: The Lost Decade of the Middle Class, PEW RESEARCH
CTR., 21 (August 22, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/08/pew-socialtrends-lost-decade-of-the-middle-class.pdf.
285. FRUSTRATION WITH CONGRESS, supra note 259, at 4.
286. See, e.g., Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (restricting,
among other things, commercial banks from engaging principally in investment banking
activities).
287. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 329–30 (1963).
288. Id. at 325.
289. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 34–37 (2010).
290. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362–63.
291. Id. at 330; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 289, at 36 (providing figures on annual
bank suspensions and failures).
292. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 289, at 59, 64–87; STEPHEN A. RHOADES, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., BANK MERGERS AND INDUSTRYWIDE STRUCTURE,
1980–94, at 3 (1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/199099/ss169.pdf (finding that an average of 190 bank mergers occurred annually between 1960
and 1982); STEPHEN A. RHOADES, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., BANK
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banks each year between 1986 and 1998 ceased to exist independently.293
The DOJ observed that the megamergers ranked “among the largest U.S.
bank mergers ever, in terms of the real value of assets involved, and in
terms of the share of total U.S. bank assets accounted for by the merging
banks.”294
But the federal government did little to arrest this trend toward
concentration and mergers that created banks too big to fail. In considering
only the bank mergers’ claimed short-term productive efficiencies and price
effects in narrowly defined markets (namely small business loans), the DOJ
did not consider other economic, political, and social costs from trends
toward concentration.295 The DOJ discounted or ignored the dangers of
concentration, the mergers’ impact on systemic risk, and their impact on the
financial system’s overall efficiency, competitiveness, and stability.296 One
official recounted how the DOJ required divestitures in only five of the
1,900 bank mergers it screened in 1995.297 The DOJ assured the bankers
that despite challenging only 0.3 percent of reviewed bank mergers, the
DOJ “successfully prevented anticompetitive effects from bank mergers,
ensuring that competitive options are preserved while at the same time
permitting most of the efficiencies associated with those mergers . . . . In
sum, bank merger policy in the ’90s is a win-win situation for all.”298
Take for example the 1998 merger between Travelers Group Inc. and
Citicorp, which created the world’s largest commercial banking
organization, with total consolidated assets of approximately $751 billion.
During its merger review, the DOJ, according to one official, “heard
numerous complaints that Citigroup [the proposed merged entity] would
MERGERS AND BANKING STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–98, at 3 (2000), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/2000-present/ss174.pdf [hereinafter MERGERS &
BANKING 1980–98] (finding that an average of 420 bank mergers annually between 1980 and
1998, for a total of about 8,000 mergers—“equal to about 55 percent of all banks in
existence in 1980”); ROUNDTABLE ON COMPETITION, CONCENTRATION AND STABILITY IN THE
BANKING SECTOR (Feb 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/international
270405.pdf (“During the period 1994 through 2006, the Department reviewed more than
1,000 bank acquisition/merger applications annually.”).
293. MERGERS & BANKING 1980–98, supra note 292, at 25.
294. Robert Kramer, Chief, Litig. II Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Address at the Am. Bar. Ass’n, Antitrust Section, “Mega-Mergers” in the Banking Industry
(Apr. 14, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/214845.pdf.
295. Hearing Concerning Mergers in the Financial Services Industry Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of John M. Nannes, Deputy Asst.
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div.), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/testimony/1787.htm (“To the extent that our investigations have resulted in a
determination that competitive concerns exist, it has most often been with respect to the
availability of banking services, including loans and credit, to small and medium-sized
businesses. Such small and medium-sized businesses may have few alternatives available to
them for some of their credit needs.”).
296. Id.
297. Constance K. Robinson, Dir. of Operations, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div.,
Address Before the 31st Annual Banking Law Inst., Washington, D.C. (May 30, 1996),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/1003.htm.
298. Id.
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have an undue aggregation of resources—that the deal would create[] a firm
too big to be allowed to fail.”299 But the DOJ “essentially viewed this as
primarily a regulatory issue to be considered by the [Federal Reserve
Board].”300 The Federal Reserve Board dismissed this and several other
concerns, which presaged the financial crisis a decade later. Both the DOJ
and Federal Reserve ignored concerns that the merger “would result in an
undue concentration of resources and in an organization that is both ‘too big
to fail’ and ‘too big to supervise.’”301
With lax antitrust review and deregulation, the financial services
industries became highly concentrated after the merger wave of the 1980s
and 1990s. JPMorgan Chase, for example, arose from mergers involving
eleven financial institutions; Bank of America from thirteen institutions;
and Wells Fargo from nine institutions.302 As it consolidated, the financial
services industry commanded a higher share of gross domestic product
(GDP) and overall corporate profits.303 Between 2001 and 2010, average
compensation in the finance sector was 70 to 90 percent higher than in other
industries, and for those in investment banking and securities dealing, their
average compensation was 300 to 450 percent higher.304 As a result,
investment bankers comprised a larger share of the wealthiest 0.1 percent
than other senior executives.305
Today, six bank holding companies—Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Bank
of America, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley—dominate
the industry and are considered “too big and too integral to fail” (TBTF). In
the third quarter of 2010, the assets of these six bank holding companies
were worth 64 percent of GDP—higher than in 2006 (about 55 percent of

299. Kramer, supra note 294.
300. Id.
301. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Travelers Group, Inc. and Citicorp, Order
Approving Formation of a Bank Holding Company and Notice to Engage in Nonbanking
Activities, 84 FED. RES. BULL. 985, at 74 (Sept. 23, 1998), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/press/BHC/1998/19980923/19980923.pdf.
302. How Banks Got Too Big To Fail, MOTHER JONES (Jan./Feb. 2010), http://mother
jones.com/politics/2010/01/bank-merger-history.
303. KEVIN PHILLIPS, BAD MONEY: RECKLESS FINANCE, FAILED POLITICS, AND THE
GLOBAL CRISIS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 31–32 (2008); see also FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 110 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOCAR2011.pdf (“With the exception of the recent recession,
finance accounted for 25 percent to 50 percent of all corporate profits over the past
decade.”). The profits of the financial sector and other sectors historically grew the same
rate; between 1980 and 2005, however, the financial sector’s profits increased 800 percent,
whereas other sectors grew 250 percent. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 289, at 60.
304. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 303, at 110. In 1989, the chief
executives at the seven largest bank holding companies “earned an average of $2.8 million,
or 97 times the median U.S. household income of $28,906 for that year.” Id. By 2007, the
CEOs at the six largest bank holding companies “earned an average of $26 million, or 516
times the [2007] median household income of $50,233,” and “2.3 times the average total
compensation of the CEOs at the top 50 nonbank companies.” Id. at 110–11.
305. Special Report, supra note 226, at 10 (“America’s top 25 hedge-fund managers
make more [money] than all the CEOs of the S&P 500 combined.”).
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GDP) and 1995 (17 percent of GDP).306 In contrast, the combined assets of
all commercial banks in 1978 were worth 53 percent of GDP.307 Similarly,
the four largest U.S. commercial banking firms (Bank of America, Wells
Fargo, JPMorgan Chase, and Citigroup) account for over 34 percent of
national deposits and over 56 percent of the market in general purpose
credit card purchase volume; they originated roughly 58 percent of
mortgage loans by volume in 2009 and serviced 56.3 percent of such
loans.308 In contrast, the twenty-five largest banks accounted for only 29.1
percent of deposits in 1980.309 Ironically, as a result of mergers during the
financial crisis, the big six became even bigger,310 and the industry became
more concentrated as nonbank mortgage lenders exited.311
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, among others,
recommended, “If they’re too big to fail, they’re too big. . . . In 1911 we
broke up Standard Oil—so what happened? The individual parts became
more valuable than the whole. Maybe that’s what we need to do.”312 But
the reality is that the political will and accountability to break up these firms
are absent.
This dissatisfaction over antitrust enforcement is not confined to the
financial services industry. In 2010, the DOJ and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) held public workshops on competition issues affecting
the agricultural sector.313 The agencies heard many complaints about the
state of antitrust enforcement. In Alabama, they heard how the “‘lack of
antitrust enforcement in recent decades’ has resulted in ‘a severely
concentrated marketplace in which power and profit are limited to a few at
306. Simon Johnson, The Bill Daley Problem, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2011, 8:08
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-johnson/bill-daley-obama-chief-of-staff_b_806
341.html.
307. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 289, at 59.
308. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
CONCENTRATION LIMITS ON LARGE FINANCIAL COMPANIES 13, 24 (Jan. 2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/Study%20on%20
Concentration%20Limits%20on%20Large%20Firms%2001-17-11.pdf.
309. MERGERS & BANKING 1980–98, supra note 292, at 26; SANDERS, supra note 253, at
37–38.
310. Richard W. Fisher, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of Dall., Remarks Before
the Senior Delegates Roundtable of the Fixed Income Forum, Two Areas of Present
Concern: The Economic Outlook and the Pathology of Too-Big-To-Fail (July 23, 2009),
available at http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2009/fs090723.cfm (with
reference to Errol Flynn, Johnny Mercer, Gary Stern, and Voltaire) (“Bank of America’s
assets grew 51 percent from June 2007 to March 2009, assisted in no small part by its
acquisitions of Countrywide Financial and Merrill. Wells Fargo’s asset base grew 138
percent, thanks mainly to its acquisition of Wachovia. J.P. Morgan Chase acquired both
Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual and grew 43 percent.”).
311. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 289, at 159–64, 171, 180.
312. Michael McKee & Scott Lanman, Greenspan Says U.S. Should Consider Breaking
Up Large Banks, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2009, 10:50 EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=email_en&sid=aJ8HPmNUfchg.
313. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND AGRICULTURE: VOICES FROM THE
WORKSHOPS ON AGRICULTURE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN OUR 21ST CENTURY
ECONOMY AND THOUGHTS ON THE WAY FORWARD (2012) [hereinafter DOJ AG REPORT],
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/283291.pdf.
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the expense of countless, hard working family farmers.’”314 In Wisconsin,
they heard how a recent enforcement action (Dean Foods’ acquisition of
plants from Foremost Farms) was an “anomaly,” when “‘a lot of megamergers’ . . . ‘have allowed a lot of concentration of market power.’”315
They heard from Wisconsin’s Secretary of Agriculture that “as with the big
banks and big oil and big mining, it’s long been evident that meaningful
enforcement of antitrust and anticoncentration policy [regulations] in our
food and [agricultural] industry have been sadly missing in recent
decades.”316 The participants found it “‘appalling that our antitrust
enforcement has not been more vigorous than it has been in the past.’”317
One “panelist charged that ‘merger policy has been broken for 10 years, if
not 20 or 30.’”318
C. Should Competition Law Maximize Consumer Welfare?
One response is that even if competition policy contributed to the dismal
economic state of many Americans, the problem did not arise from
competition policy’s consumer welfare objective. Rather, antitrust’s legal
standards and enforcement have failed to effectuate the consumer welfare
objective. Rather than displace the consumer welfare objective, the courts
and agencies need only recalibrate antitrust’s legal standards and
enforcement to better promote consumers’ welfare.
This raises a more challenging issue. Suppose courts and enforcers could
agree that maximizing consumer welfare is antitrust’s sole or primary
objective; could agree on a definition of consumer welfare (such as
increasing consumer surplus319); and could design administrable legal
standards for evaluating restraints or mergers that posed a significant risk of
increased market power and lower consumer surplus.320 Would Americans’
314. Id. at 5.
315. Id.
316. Transcript of Proceedings at Public Workshops Exploring Competition Issues in
Agriculture: Dairy Workshop 38 (June 25, 2010) (statement of Rod Nilsestuen, Wis. Sec’y
of Agric.), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/ag2010/wisconsinagworkshop-transcript.pdf.
317. DOJ AG REPORT, supra note 313, at 5.
318. Id.
319. OECD, supra note 50, at 28 (defining consumer surplus as the “excess of social
valuation of product over the price actually paid,” and “is measured by the area of a triangle
below a demand curve and above the observed price”). For example: suppose you are
willing to pay $25 for a book, which when you go to the bookstore is on sale for $15; your
consumer surplus is $10.
320. Although this Article uses as a shorthand “promoting consumer surplus,” U.S.
antitrust policy does not seek to increase consumer surplus per se. For example, a monopoly
can charge a higher than competitive price without violating the Sherman Act. Indeed, the
extra profits may serve as an incentive to invest in research and development. Instead
antitrust law seeks to enjoin mergers and restraints of trade that “create, enhance, or entrench
market power or to facilitate its exercise.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES],
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf. So, antitrust policy
targets mergers and restraints that enable firms “to raise price, reduce output, diminish
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well-being significantly increase as a result? The happiness economics
literature suggests no.
1. Increasing a Wealthy Society’s Overall Wealth Does Not Necessarily
Increase Overall Well-Being
One insight from the happiness literature is that well-being is promoted
along multiple dimensions, including (i) material well-being (income and
wealth, housing, and jobs and earnings) and (ii) quality of life (health status,
work and life balance, education and skills, social connections, civic
engagement and governance, environmental quality, and personal
security.321
A competition policy that seeks to increase consumer surplus and thereby
increase material well-being makes more sense in developing economies
where most consumers have insufficient wealth to satisfy their most basic
needs.322 After all, if impoverished consumers must choose between milk
and bread, then with all else equal, lowering the price of milk and bread
significantly benefits consumers’ health and well-being.
But if competition policy’s sole or primary goal is to maximize consumer
surplus in a post-industrial economy where many are materially well-off,
then the competition policy has a minor, or at times inconsequential, role in
maximizing total well-being. Increasing consumer surplus will not always
increase total well-being. The happiness economics literature shows that
after one’s basic needs are met, increasing income does not significantly
increase experienced, day-to-day happiness.323 As the country’s living
standards increase and its citizens’ basic material needs, such as food,
clothing and shelter, are met, then the citizens will likely place greater
importance on quality-of-life factors associated with well-being, such as
work and life balance, social connections, safety, and environmental
quality.324 Material well-being still matters (especially employment) in
promoting well-being. Economic growth can also promote other values,
such as “openness of opportunity, tolerance, economic and social mobility,

innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or
incentives.” Id. Thus, if a firm by acquiring its rival can raise prices above competitive
levels, consumer surplus will be lost. It is in this manner that this Article means promoting
consumer surplus.
321. Better Life Initiative: Compendium of OECD Well-Being Indicators, OECD, 6
(2011), http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3746,en_2649_201185_47916764_1_1_1_1,00
.html; see also Hall et al., supra note 59, at 8–10, 17.
322. Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing
Illusion, 312 SCIENCE 1908, 1909 (2006) (life satisfaction tends to rise when GDP per capita
is at preexisting low levels of income, but tapers off once GDP per capita exceeds $12,000).
323. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 17; Elizabeth Dunn et al., Spending Money on Others
Promotes Happiness, 319 SCIENCE 1687, 1687 (2008); Frey & Stutzer, supra note 70, at 409–
10.
324. Kahneman et al., supra note 322, at 1909.
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fairness, and democracy.”325 But there is less bang (in terms of increased
well-being) for that extra buck of consumer surplus.
First, individuals assess their life satisfaction differently than their
financial condition—the two are not coextensive.326 Second, higher income
is more strongly correlated with life satisfaction than experienced, day-today happiness. In the United States, higher-income individuals (those in the
highest decile) reported, on average, the highest level of happiness.327 But
increases in income beyond a certain amount (one study found $75,000) did
not promote the residents’ experienced, day-to-day happiness.328
Third, after many citizens’ basic needs are met, the empirical literature
does not conclusively find a strong correlation between increases in
society’s wealth and subjective well-being.329 For example, the mean
income (adjusted for inflation) of the top decile in the United States
increased 33 percent between 1972 and 1996, but the mean happiness rating
for that wealthy group remained the same.330 The Easterlin Paradox,
named for Professor Easterlin’s 1974 article, finds that “a higher rise in
personal income leads to higher subjective well-being for that person, but
that a rise in average incomes for a country does not give rise to a
corresponding increase in the country’s average subjective well-being.”331
The economic literature, for example, did not identify a correlation between
the doubling of wealth in the United States between 1945 and 1991 and
325. BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH ix
(2005); see also id. at 79–102. On a macro level, as Professor Friedman describes, whenever
America was mired in economic stagnation its democratic values stagnated as well (with the
exception of the Great Depression). Hostility toward immigrants, the poor, and other
competing groups, whether by nationality, religion, race, or gender, increased as these
groups were seemingly threatened by others stealing their fixed or dwindling share of the
pie. In contrast, during periods of economic growth, our society slowly progressed from this
zero-sum mentality toward openness, mobility, and democracy.
326. Van Praag et al., supra note 117, at 1012, 1014 (84 percent of surveyed were
satisfied or very much satisfied with their lives, while only 53 percent very satisfied with
their financial condition).
327. Frey & Stutzer, supra note 70, at 410 (showing that on a three-point scale ranging
from not too happy (1), pretty happy (2), and very happy (3), the tenth decile between 1994
and 1996 had a mean happiness rating of 2.36, which was slightly higher than the ninth
decile’s mean of 2.3); Kahneman et al., supra note 322, at 1909.
328. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 396–97; Kahneman & Deaton, supra note 99, at
16,491 (looking to a U.S. survey of subjective well-being and finding that, beyond
approximately $75,000, higher income “is neither the road to experienced happiness nor the
road to the relief of unhappiness or stress, although higher income continues to improve
individuals’ life evaluations”).
329. ADAIR TURNER, ECONOMICS AFTER THE CRISIS: OBJECTIVES AND MEANS xii, 3–11
(2012).
330. Frey & Stutzer, supra note 70, at 410.
331. OECD, supra note 17, at 271; see also BOK, supra note 12, at 10–16 (discussing
Easterlin paradox, and responses thereto); FREY, supra note 12, at 38–41; Rafael Di Tella &
Robert MacCulloch, Some Uses of Happiness Data in Economics, J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26
(2006) (“[A] similar pattern has been observed in a large number of countries, including
France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan, and for different periods of time. In
Japan, income rose by a multiple of five between 1958 and 1987, and happiness remained
stationary.”).
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greater well-being.332 So even where income is correlated with one
dimension of well-being, relative, rather than absolute, income may be the
determining factor.333 Mixed results were found in other countries. China,
for example, experienced rapid economic growth between 1994 and 2005
(“real income per capita increasing by a factor of 2.5”) and greater material
well-being (e.g., “ownership of color television sets rose from 40 percent of
households to 82 percent, and the fraction with a telephone jumped from 10
percent to 63 percent”); nonetheless the Chinese people have expressed
greater dissatisfaction.334 Other studies, however, have found in several
European countries that the citizens’ life satisfaction increased with the
growth in per capita GDP.335 Consequently, for wealthy developed
countries, “the relationship between average income and human wellbeing,” remains, as one economist observes, “uncertain and complex.”336
One recent study of well-being across poorer and wealthier countries
found a shift from materialist to post-materialist well-being.337 As
countries become wealthier, individual well-being tends to become more
post-materialist338: “The more widespread post-materialist values are in a
society, the more the citizenry values personal autonomy, relative to
income, as a source of [subjective well-being].”339 People now derive
greater satisfaction from job creativity than income.340 And “[i]n richer
countries, personal autonomy drives life satisfaction—relative to income—
more strongly.”341 In short, “money matters less in richer countries.”342
So competition policies’ goals must evolve accordingly. The goal can no
longer be maximizing consumer surplus at the expense or in lieu of other
important quality-of-life factors (such as individual freedoms, autonomy,
332. BOK, supra note 12, at 11–12; LAYARD, supra note 12, at 29–30.
333. Dolan et al., supra note 107, at 98 (noting that, “if the relative income effect
dominates the absolute income effect, this would explain why cross section data show that
wealthier individuals within a society are happier, but that average SWB levels remain
constant as all members become wealthier”); see also OECD, supra note 17, at 276 (noting
the nonlinear relationship between life satisfaction and income).
334. Kahneman & Krueger, supra note 70, at 15–16.
335. Daniel W. Sacks et al., The New Stylized Facts About Income and Subjective WellBeing 9 (IZA, Discussion Paper No. 7105, 2012), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp7105.pdf
(explaining that, in eight of the nine E.U. countries, economic growth has been accompanied
to different degrees with rising average well-being). In the United States, however, life
satisfaction has decreased since 1972, even though GDP approximately doubled during that
time. Id. at 10; see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 149 (finding from the more
recent research that the “Easterlin paradox does not apply to cross-country comparisons of
life evaluations at the world level” and in one study of eighteen countries found a 0.58
correlation between changes in GDP and ladder-of-life scores over thirty years).
336. TURNER, supra note 329, at 9.
337. Jan Delhey, From Materialist to Post-materialist Happiness? National Affluence
and Determinants of Life Satisfaction in Cross-national Perspective, 97 SOC. INDICATORS
RES. 65, 74–77 (2010).
338. Id. at 74.
339. Id. at 73.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 74.
342. Id. at 76–77.
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environmental protection, and democracy). The incremental gains in total
well-being come not from more luxury goods at lower prices, but in
fostering market relations that promote other-regarding civic virtues.343
2. Why Promoting Consumer Surplus Does Not Necessarily
Promote Consumer Welfare
Several factors suggest why promoting consumer surplus in a postindustrial economy where many are materially well-off will not necessarily
promote consumer welfare, and any competition policy with this as its sole
or primary aim will be ineffective at accomplishing its goals.
First, promoting consumer surplus treats all forms of consumption as
positive even though consumption can harm the user and society (such as
with cigarettes).344 Consider obesity. While nutrition remains an issue,
only 1.8 percent of Americans in 2007–08, based on their body mass index
(BMI), were underweight and only 31.6 percent were at a healthy weight.345
Most Americans were overweight (33.9%) or obese (32.6%).
In
comparison, 17 percent of the OECD member countries are obese.346
Granted, problems exist with relying on BMI,347 but muscularity does not
bedevil many Americans. Between 1980 and 2009, America’s per capita
consumption increased for corn sweeteners (35.3 to 65.7 pounds), caloric
sweeteners (120.2 to 130.7 pounds), and total fat content (56.9 to 78.6
pounds).348 How important then is promoting consumer surplus and
reducing the deadweight welfare loss for snack cakes,349 carbonated soft
drinks,350 salted snack foods,351 or superpremium ice cream?352 If obese
citizens have lower well-being levels and lower levels of income mobility
on average than those not obese,353 why promote consumer surplus (and
output) for unhealthy foods? The rationale is that competition law, absent
any immunities or exemptions, applies to all industries.354 The agencies or
343. See Sargent, supra note 128, at 52 (discussing Antonio Genovesi’s work).
344. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 11.
345. U.S. Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Age-Adjusted Percent Distributions of Body
Mass Index (BMI) Among Persons 18 Years Old and over by Selected Characteristics:
2007–2008, CENSUS tbl.211, www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0211.xls
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
346. OECD, supra note 17, at 113.
347. Linda Tarr Kent, Problems with the BMI Index, LIVESTRONG.COM (May 6, 2010),
http://www.livestrong.com/article/117703-problems-bmi-index/.
348. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Per Capita
Consumption of Major Food Commodities: 1980 to 2009, CENSUS tbl.217 (2012),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0217.pdf.
349. See Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1263 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
350. See FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1986).
351. See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Bachman Co., 659 F. Supp. 1129, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
352. See Nestle Holdings, Inc., et al., Analysis To Aid Public Comment, 68 Fed. Reg.
39,564 (July 2, 2003).
353. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 43–44.
354. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Harmful Output in the Antitrust Domain: Lessons from
the Tobacco Industry, 39 GA. L. REV. 321, 409 (2005) (“Realism cautions that federal and
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courts cannot limit competition policy to those industries that they believe
provide healthy and useful products.
Nonetheless, reconciling a consumer surplus goal with other societal
objectives can be difficult. When the FTC challenged a tobacco merger,
one district court struggled:
The Commission’s action in this case appears anomalous when
juxtaposed to other government efforts respecting tobacco sales in the
United States. In recent years, the government has made every effort to
stem the consumption of tobacco by the public. The government
specifically has sought to discourage consumption by increasing the
prices of tobacco products through taxes, regulating tobacco advertising,
and decreasing the amount of shelf space devoted to tobacco products at
stores. Here, by contrast, the FTC has vigorously and successfully
opposed an acquisition of a chewing tobacco product on the basis that it
will result in anticompetitive effects and price increases. This effort by
the government therefore appears to be incoherent with its other efforts
respecting tobacco. At the same time, the Court appreciates the
Commission’s explanation that if the acquisition is permitted then
consumption of loose leaf will not decline. Rather, consumers will
simply be paying more for that consumption. And even if the defendants
were correct on their arguments that significant substitution would result,
consumption would merely switch from loose leaf to moist snuff. Thus,
there is ultimately no public health benefit to permitting the
acquisition.355

Consumers nonetheless may desire less consumer surplus, such as smokers
with imperfect willpower who favor a sin tax on tobacco.356
Second, maximizing consumer surplus is a questionable, and arguably a
counterproductive, antitrust objective for status goods where consumers
want high prices (at least for others) to signal conspicuous consumption.357
While consumers may prefer getting the Hermes scarf at a discount, they
would not want the scarf to become affordable for most Americans.358
Third, the aim of promoting consumer surplus can devolve into
promoting materialism, which does not promote well-being.359 For
essential goods and services, such as basic foods, medication, etc., a lower
state antitrust authorities are unlikely to embrace anticompetitive conduct creating positive
social welfare effects in net-harm industries. The ideology of competition may be too firmly
engrained to permit such a radical paradigm shift without a legislative nudge.”).
355. FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 153–54 n.1 (D.D.C. 2000).
356. Di Tella & MacCulloch, supra note 331, at 35–36 (summarizing one study where “a
50-cent tax per pack of cigarettes would leave predicted smokers with the same level of
happiness as those who are not predicted to smoke in the United States”); see also FREY,
supra note 12, at 9–10; Huang, Happiness Studies, supra note 13, at 21.12.
357. See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy
and the Role of Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893 (2010); Barak Y.
Orbach, Antitrust Vertical Myopia: The Allure of High Prices, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 261, 286
(2008).
358. VEBLEN, supra note 150, at 26 (observing that the predominant motive for
conspicuous consumption is the “invidious distinction attaching to wealth”).
359. Stucke, supra note 357, at 946–47.
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price can translate into greater savings, wealth, and better health, enabling
consumers to work less, retire earlier, or donate more. But that logic does
not extend to all discretionary goods and services. Materialism eventually
attaches to a competition policy that seeks to promote consumer surplus for
discretionary purchases. The belief is that as consumer surplus increases,
consumers can buy more things, and their well-being increases accordingly.
But as the happiness literature examines, people “who prize material goods
more highly than other values in life tend to be substantially less happy.”360
One 2007 survey found “a somewhat inconsistent but generally rather
dismal picture of materialists and individuals who aspire to financial
success.”361 Materialism or financial aspirations were positively correlated
with neuroticism, anxiety, self-criticism, depression, anger expression,
emotional instability, stress, conformity, Machiavellianism, right-wing
authoritarianism, abrasiveness, and hedonistic values.362
Fourth, promoting materialism can promote status competition,
selfishness, and envy, and marginalize quality-of-life factors correlated with
greater well-being. For many, well-being extends beyond satisfying one’s
desires to include a moral life. On an individual level, well-being is
positively correlated with family relationships, employment, community
and friends, health, self-control or autonomy, personal ethical and moral
values, and the quality of the environment.363 Prosocial spending is also
Materialism and financial
associated with greater well-being.364
aspirations, on the other hand, were negatively correlated with social
interest (care and concern for others, friendliness, empathy), agreeableness,
self-esteem, self-actualization, intelligence, religious values, family oriented
values, environmentalism, and aesthetic values.365 Individuals primed with
luxury goods, one study found, were more likely to think of themselves
than others and were “significantly more likely to endorse production of a
new car that might pollute the environment, . . . launch a new software with
bugs, . . . and market a video game that might induce violence.”366 Trading
off social relations for consuming more goods, and an increase in status
360. FREY, supra note 12, at 29. See generally M. Joseph Sirgy, Materialism and Quality
of Life, 43 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 227 (1998).
361. Carol Nickerson et al., Financial Aspirations, Financial Success, and Overall Life
Satisfaction: Who? and How?, 8 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 467, 469 (2007).
362. Id. at 469–74.
363. BOK, supra note 12, at 17; LAYARD, supra note 12, at 62–73; NETTLE, supra note 12,
at 85, 87.
364. Lara B. Aknin et al., Prosocial Spending and Well-Being: Cross-cultural Evidence
for a Psychological Universal 8, 13 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 11-038, 2010),
available at www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-038.pdf (observing a positive relationship in
prosocial spending and subjective well-being in 122 of 136 surveyed countries and in an
experiment involving Canadians and Ugandans).
365. Nickerson et al., supra note 361, at 469–74.
366. Roy Y.J. Chua & Xi Zou, The Devil Wears Prada? Effects of Exposure to Luxury
Goods on Cognition and Decision Making 6 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 10-034)
(2009), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/10-034.pdf (luxury
primed participants watched ads for a diamond watch and leather oxford shoes and
completed a questionnaire).
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competition at the cost of reducing social relations, can decrease wellbeing.367 Materialism is detrimental not only to the individual, but society.
“A consumption culture” is negatively related to concern for the
environment; participation in public domain issues; and involvement in
family, community, and social issues.368 A competition policy, whose
primary purpose is to promote lower prices and greater output of goods and
services can also conflict with other policies that seek to improve quality of
life. Sustainability issues arise from increased energy consumption, waste,
and environmental degradation.
Fifth, even if people experienced greater happiness when purchasing
additional material goods, that happiness, at least on a day-to-day
experienced basis, is likely to be short-lived.369 Individuals adapt to higher
incomes (and increased consumer surplus) and have greater income
aspirations.370 Winners of large amounts of money in lotteries, for
example, have a temporary boost in experienced well-being.371 Individuals
may desire more goods and services but, after obtaining them, they become
preoccupied with obtaining other goods and services.372
Sixth, if many view consumer surplus in relative terms (how much
additional surplus they have relative to their peers) rather than absolute
terms (how much wealth they have), it is questionable that people derive
greater well-being from greater consumer surplus.373 People often have
reference-based utility.374 They do not care solely about absolute levels of
367. Pugno, supra note 71, at 592–95 (providing economic model); id. at 595–97
(empirical illustration); see also James A. Roberts & Aimee Clement, Materialism and
Satisfaction with Over-All Quality of Life and Eight Life Domains, 82 SOC. INDICATORS RES.
79 (2007).
368. Roberts & Clement, supra note 367, at 82.
369. FREY, supra note 12, at 40; Kahneman et al., supra note 322, at 1909–10.
370. FREY, supra note 12, at xi; Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 65, at 168.
371. NETTLE, supra note 12, at 75. Even people with acquired disabilities or health
problems show considerable, but not always complete, adaptation to happiness. Id. at 83.
372. NETTLE, supra note 12, at 76–77; Kahneman et al., supra note 322, at 1909–10.
373. TURNER, supra note 329, at 16 (noting that the “implicit assumption of any simply
presented marginal-utility curve—that my utility is a function of my income alone—is
clearly wrong. My utility is clearly also a function of other people’s income and of my
income relative to that of others.”).
374. LAYARD, supra note 12, at 41–43; NETTLE, supra note 12, at 73; Di Tella &
MacCulloch, supra note 331, at 35 (surveying the literature and finding that “the overall
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that an individual’s happiness or utility is not just
a function of income at a point in time, as in the standard model most often used by
economists, but that happiness adapts to changes in income over time, and that at a point in
time, happiness also comes from relative levels of income.”); Matthew Rabin, A Perspective
on Psychology and Economics, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 657, 661 (2002). Similarly, people
rarely choose things in absolute terms, but instead based on their relative advantage or
disadvantage to a reference point. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality:
Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1456 (2003). One
experiment examined whether the fear of losing the social competition inherent in an auction
game, in part, causes people to pay too much. Mauricio R. Delgado et al., Understanding
Overbidding: Using the Neural Circuitry of Reward To Design Economic Auctions,
SCIENCE, Sept. 26, 2008, at 1849. At the beginning of each auction round, the loss-frame
group members were given fifteen dollars; they were told that if they won the auction for
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wealth or personal consumption but also about changes in their wealth and
consumption relative to others.375 One’s total income is less important than
how much one earns relative to one’s peers, neighbors, friends, or, as H.L.
Mencken observed, one’s wife’s sister’s husband.376 People compare
themselves to the wealth and consumption of their peers and the
socioeconomic class immediately above them; after adapting to the higher
rung, they strive for more.377
Seventh, increasing consumer surplus for some goods and services does
not necessarily increase total well-being when consumers use that surplus to
compete for goods and services in short supply.378 If consumers, for
example, use their extra wealth to compete for holiday vacation lodgings
and restaurants, they are not necessarily happier. They either have to pay
more than others for a quieter beachfront experience or accept the cheaper,
albeit noisier and crowded, beach.379 Increasing surplus can also increase
consumption that increases negative externalities. As anyone caught in
Beijing traffic knows, the increasing availability of vehicles can decrease
well-being with longer commute times and poorer air quality.
Eighth, the behavioral economics literature further draws into question
consumer surplus as a normative goal. Professor Kirkwood, for example,
discusses how competition policy protects consumers and small suppliers
from wealth transfers arising from anticompetitive conduct.
But
that round, they would get the payoff from the auction and could keep the fifteen dollars. If
they lost, they must return the fifteen dollars. Id. at 1851. The bonus-frame group members
were told that if they won that auction round they would get a fifteen-dollar bonus at the end
of the round. Id. This framing should not affect the bidding, since under both frames the
winner gets an extra fifteen dollars, the loser gets nothing. Id. at 1852. Nonetheless the losstreatment group members outbid the bonus-treatment group members, which outbid the
baseline group. Id. Professor Ariely examined whether by adding a third more expensive
choice, the marketer can steer consumers to a more expensive second choice. DAN ARIELY,
PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 2 (2010). One
hundred MIT students were offered three choices for The Economist magazine: (i) internetonly subscription for fifty-nine dollars (sixteen students); (ii) print-only subscriptions for
$125 (no students); and (iii) print-and-internet subscriptions for $125 (eighty-four students).
Id. at 5. When the “decoy” second choice (print-only subscriptions) was removed and only
the first and third options were presented, the students did not react similarly. Id. at 5–6.
Instead sixty-eight students opted for internet-only subscription for fifty-nine dollars (up
from sixteen students) and only thirty-two students chose print-and-internet subscriptions for
$125 (down from eighty-four students). Id. at 5–6.
375. See Rabin, supra note 374, at 661; Stutzer & Frey, supra note 52, at 690.
376. Kahneman et al., supra note 322, at 1909; see also David Neumark & Andrew
Postlewaite, Relative Income Concerns and the Rise in Married Women’s Employment,
70 J. PUB. ECON. 157 (1998) (finding that women’s employment decisions are positively
related to sisters’ employment decisions; all else being equal, women whose sisters live
nearby and worked the past year are about 10 to 15 percent more likely to work than women
whose sisters did not work).
377. ARIELY, supra note 374, at 17–18.
378. TURNER, supra note 329, at 29 (noting that while marginal utility of wealth can be
partially offset by the marginal utility from consuming new products and services, once we
introduce behavioral assumptions, we may end up with an aggregate marginal-utility curve
that is increasing but a declining rate).
379. TURNER, supra note 329, at 14–15.
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competition policy is not about maximizing consumer surplus per se but
promoting fairness.380 Citizens value fairness. “A basic rule of fairness,”
Kahneman and others found, “is that the exploitation of market power to
impose losses on others is unacceptable.”381 The behavioral economics
literature suggests that “framing effects” (how the issue is worded or
framed) do matter.382 Consumers typically base fairness on the deviation
from an established reference point.383 Deviations from the perceived
reference point are marked by asymmetric price elasticity, whereby many
are more sensitive to price increases than price cuts.384 Losses hurt more
than the joy from comparable gains, and whether the price change is coded
as a loss or gain affects fairness determinations.385 Thus, the fairness
concerns that animate competition policy are not simply about maximizing
consumer surplus by keeping prices low—a less important goal in a
developed economy. Rather, competition policy is about protecting
consumers from the exploitation of increased market power, which is often
seen as a departure from moral or social norms or other established
reference points.386 So, many consumers do not begrudge the monopoly
that charges more for a better product. But they do complain when the
firm, whether by merger or exit by its rivals, becomes the corporate bully.
The monopsony employer that cuts its workers pay affects well-being far
more than a comparable pay increase would. By preventing such
380. John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small
Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2432 (2013).
381. KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 306.
382. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); see also STEFFEN HUCK ET AL., OFFICE OF FAIR
TRADING, CONSUMER BEHAVIOURAL BIASES IN COMPETITION: A SURVEY ¶¶ 3.90–.107
(2011), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/research/OFT1324.pdf.
383. See supra note 374 and accompanying text; see also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L.
Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness As a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in
the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729 (1986) (“A central concept in analyzing the
fairness of actions in which a firm sets the terms of future exchanges is the reference
transaction, a relevant precedent that is characterized by a reference price or wage, and by a
positive reference profit to the firm.” (emphasis omitted)).
384. Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 148, 152 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004) (Many
consumers “dislike price increases more than they like the windfall gain from price cuts and
will cut back purchases more when prices rise compared with the extra amount they buy
when prices fall.”); see also OECD, COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN AGRICULTURE:
MONOPSONY BUYING AND JOINT SELLING 8 (2005), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/
abuse/35910977.pdf (discussing whether the substantial evidence of price asymmetry
commonly cited by farmers may arise “from different search patterns by consumers when
they face increasing prices compared to decreasing prices. In particular, they may search
more aggressively for alternative suppliers when prices increase, but less aggressively when
prices are stable or slowly decreasing.”).
385. For example, the majority of people, in one survey, felt it was unfair that a company,
in a community experiencing a recession with substantial unemployment but no inflation,
decreased wages and salaries by 7 percent. Few thought it unfair, however, if the company
increased salaries by only 5 percent in the face of overall inflation of 12 percent. Under both
scenarios, workers’ wages are effectively reduced by 7 percent. Kahneman et al., supra note
383, at 371–72.
386. Id. at 734–36; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 67, at 306.
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anticompetitive behavior, competition policy does not necessarily promote
lower prices per se, but our perceptions of a just or fair society.387
Accordingly, if consumer surplus increases in an already wealthy
economy, then many people, aside from the lower-income and poor, will
unlikely be happier as a result.388 If the consumer surplus is distributed
unevenly and greater wealth inequality ensues, the wealthier may have
greater life satisfaction but not necessarily greater experienced day-to-day
happiness.389 Plus, as Part III.D discusses, there will be greater incentives
for the wealthy to use the law to safeguard and augment their interests,
which can reduce total well-being.390
3. Why Lowering Gas Prices May Not Increase Well-Being.
One response is that if consumer surplus does not improve well-being,
why do many consumers bargain and shop for discounts?391 Why else do
consumers queue late Thanksgiving evening outside department stores?
Why else do gasoline prices “exert an unrivaled hold on the public
imagination”?392 The rise in gasoline prices played a greater role in the
2012 U.S. presidential debates393 than antitrust policy. So wouldn’t
consumers be happier if the DOJ prosecuted the OPEC cartel and lower gas
prices resulted?
As The New York Times reports, “there is surprisingly little evidence that
gas prices deserve an outsize reputation for economic and political
influence.”394 One study found that gas prices were inversely related with
life satisfaction.395 But this dissatisfaction was short-lived; life satisfaction,
the study found, largely rebounded a year later.396 So why aren’t Americans
necessarily happier when they pay $2.00 per gallon rather than $3.50?397
387. Kirkwood, supra note 380, at 2453–56.
388. TURNER, supra note 329, at 33 (“[O]ne thing we know with reasonable certainty is
that increasing average per capita GDP beyond the levels achieved in rich developed
countries doesn’t, by itself, ensure significant increases in self-perceived well-being, and
therefore is not a useful definition of the overriding objective of economic activity.”).
389. BOK, supra note 12, at 12.
390. TURNER, supra note 329, at 33; Stucke, supra note 207, at 339–40.
391. Many U.S. and French women surveyed, however, experienced more stress, sadness,
or pain from shopping than happiness; indeed the hedonic experience from shopping trailed
most other daily activities, including housework, reading, and walking. CMEPSP REPORT,
supra note 16, at 171.
392. Binyamin Appelbaum, Price of Gas Matters to Voters, but Doesn’t Seem To Sway
Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, at A1.
393. Debate Fact Check: Examining Claims from the Presidential Showdown, NJ.COM
(Oct. 4, 2012, 10:21 AM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/10/debate_fact_check_
examining_cl.html.
394. Appelbaum, supra note 392, at A1.
395. Casey Boyd-Swan & Chris M. Herbst, Pain at the Pump: Gasoline Prices and
Subjective Well-Being, 72 J. URBAN ECON. 160, 161 (2012) (finding that a $1 increase in gas
prices for period of 1985–2005 is associated with a 4.8 percent decrease in the likelihood of
being very satisfied with life).
396. Id. at 161. Another study also found a negative relationship between gas prices and
well-being, but primarily for low- and middle-income groups, with a positive and significant
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The happiness literature discusses how people at times inaccurately
predict (1) the impact of future life events on their well-being (such as a
junior professor’s prediction if denied tenure);398 (2) their adaptation to
their new condition (whether a physical disability or winning the lottery);399
and (3) the strong effects of relative rather than absolute wealth on
satisfaction.
Behavioral economists describe this “focusing illusion” in pursuing
happiness as the fact that “[n]othing that you focus on will make as much
difference as you think.”400 One example of this bias came from a recent
experiment, which reaffirmed that “[t]here is more happiness in giving than
in receiving.”401 First, the study’s authors found from a nationally
representative survey that personal spending was unrelated to happiness but
spending more of one’s income on others predicted greater happiness.402
Higher prosocial spending (e.g., gifts for others and donations to charity)
was associated with significantly greater happiness.403 The study’s authors
next performed a before-and-after field study of employees who received a
profit-sharing bonus. They found that “employees who devoted more of
their bonus to pro-social spending experienced greater happiness after
receiving the bonus, and the manner in which they spent that bonus was a
more important predictor of their happiness than the size of the bonus
itself.”404 In a third experiment, participants, after rating their happiness in
the morning, were given an envelope containing money (either five dollars
or twenty dollars) and were told to spend the money by 5:00 p.m. that
day.405 In one group, participants were told to spend the money on
themselves; the second group was told to spend the money on someone else
or give it to a charity. After 5:00 p.m. the participants were asked about
coefficient for high income groups. CAROL GRAHAM & SOUMYA CHATTOPADHYAY,
BROOKINGS INST., (UN?)HAPPINESS AND GASOLINE PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES (2010),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2010/10/09%20gas%20prices%20h
appiness%20graham/09_gas_prices_happiness_graham.pdf. But, like the other study, this
negative relationship between rising gas prices and happiness for the middle class occurred
in the precrisis period of January to September 14, 2008, and disappeared in the periods
thereafter (September 15, 2008 to January 2010). Id. at 7–8.
397. GRAHAM & CHATTOPADHYAY, supra note 396, at 13 (not finding an increase in wellbeing when gas prices dropped below $2 per gallon).
398. Kahneman et al., supra note 322, at 1908; Kahneman & Sugden, supra note 65, at
170.
399. Stutzer & Frey, supra note 52, at 690; see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at
148; Di Tella & MacCulloch, supra note 331, at 36 n.7.
400. David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People
Happy?: A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, PSYCHOL. SCI., Sept. 1998,
at 345; see also Daniel Kahneman & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Utility Maximization
and Experienced Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 221 (2006); Uzma Khan, Defend Your
Research: The More People Want Something, the Less They’ll Like It, HARV. BUS. REV.,
June 2010, at 32.
401. 20 Acts of the Apostles 35 (New Jerusalem).
402. Dunn et al., supra note 323, at 1687.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 1688.
405. Id.
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their happiness. Although the amount of money the participants received
(five dollars or twenty dollars) did not have a significant effect on their
happiness, participants who gave the money away reported greater postwindfall happiness than did participants who spent it on themselves.406 So
if giving leads to greater happiness, the study’s authors ask, why don’t we
spend a little less on ourselves and donate a little more?407 People predict
poorly. The authors found that 63 percent of the university students
predicted personal spending would make them happier than prosocial
spending, and that twenty dollars would make them happier than five
dollars.408
Consequently, a competition policy whose sole or primary aim is to
promote consumer welfare by increasing consumer surplus will not
necessarily promote a wealthy society’s total well-being. Indeed, a
competition policy that promotes materialism and a consumption culture
will likely reduce, rather than increase, well-being. Moreover, if antitrust’s
sole aim is to promote consumer surplus, it is hard to envision competition
law as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” and as “important to the
preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill
of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”409
Rather, competition policy, under a consumer surplus goal, is simply a
costly coupon program. If antitrust’s objectives are to reduce the price of
discretionary goods, some of which are harmful to consumers, there is little
to celebrate over the policy’s efforts. As John Kenneth Galbraith observed,
“Growth consists increasingly of items of luxury consumption. Thus we
perform the considerable feat of converting the enjoyment of luxury into an
index of national virtue. This arouses at least some doubts.”410
D. Reweighing Competition Policy’s Political, Social, and Moral Goals
As Part III.A examined, competition policy never arose to promote only
one economic objective, such as consumer surplus. Competition policy
historically sought to promote political, social, and moral values of fair
competition, dispersal of economic power, and promoting economic
opportunity and individual autonomy. Despite the historical concerns about
concentrated economic power, antitrust analysis over the past thirty years
overstated the importance of competitive dynamics that were easier to
assess (productive efficiencies and short-term price effects) and
marginalized or ignored what was harder to assess (dynamic efficiencies;
systemic risk; and the political, social, and moral implications of
concentrated economic power). Americans, as Part III.B discussed, paid the
price. One benefit of the happiness literature, as Part III.C discussed, is

406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
Galbraith, supra note 71, at 118.
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exposing why a competition policy that seeks primarily to promote
consumer surplus is unlikely to increase total well-being.
Thus, we return full circle and recognize that competition policy, if it
seeks to promote total well-being, cannot maximize one narrow dimension.
Antitrust’s moral, social, and political values, which Congress emphasized,
must return to the analysis. On a positive note, the agencies acknowledge
in their latest merger guidelines the incipiency standard.411 Moreover, the
agencies, under the Clayton Act’s incipiency standard, “may challenge
mergers that in their judgment pose a real danger of harm through
coordinated effects, even without specific evidence showing precisely how
the coordination likely would take place.”412 But the risk remains that
courts and policymakers will demand proof of how the merger will lessen
competition, with a myopic concern over post-merger unilateral price
effects. Others, acknowledging antitrust’s noneconomic concerns, are
unsure how to weigh these values relative to lower prices and greater
output.
A potential benefit from the happiness literature is in assessing the value
(in terms of gained or lost well-being) of nonmarket, nonmaterial
experiences, activities, and conditions—such as autonomy, the right to vote,
and the degree of political representation.413 The happiness economics
literature is beginning to examine the relationship between well-being and
the political and economic institutions’ inclusiveness. The happiness
literature, while not there yet, may help policymakers down the road assess
the relative importance of antitrust’s noneconomic values in promoting total
well-being. Policymakers, after all, were originally interested in the
happiness literature as a way to supplement GDP measures in assessing a
country’s economic performance.414 As the OECD and other governmental
and private institutions collect data, policymakers may eventually assess the
importance of antitrust’s noneconomic values in several ways.
One way is to assess how, and the extent to which, a well-functioning
democracy promotes well-being, and then assess how competition law’s
economic and noneconomic values promote a democracy. The United
States, after all, was founded on the premise that democracy can promote

411. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 320, § 1, at 1 (“[T]he congressional intent
that merger enforcement should interdict competitive problems in their incipiency and that
certainty about anticompetitive effect is seldom possible and not required for a merger to be
illegal.”).
412. Id. § 7.1, at 25.
413. Stutzer & Frey, supra note 52, at 704; see also UK REPORT, supra note 114, at 37
(“Another use is in cost-benefit analysis in the policy appraisal process. Subjective wellbeing estimates can provide an alternative method to value the costs and benefits of different
policies. This process could also help inform decisions around which forms of spending will
lead to the largest increases in subjective well-being . . . .” (citation omitted)).
414. CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 21–22; UK REPORT, supra note 114, at 36
(“Subjective well-being data, therefore, needs to be collected to supplement existing socioeconomic measures of objective domain in order to fully understand and monitor national
well-being.”).
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happiness.415 As Professor Bok observed, “almost all the countries in the
world that rank highest in overall satisfaction with life have been successful
One study found that
democracies for more than 80 years.”416
improvements in the level of democracy between 1988 and 1998 coincided
with a statistically significant increase in well-being:
[D]irect democratic participation rights have been found to be positively
related with citizens’ well-being. . . . For the case of Switzerland, people
in cantons with more extensive rights to propose popular initiatives and to
vote on major laws and constitutional amendments report higher
satisfaction with life, many other influences on satisfaction being held
constant. This is interpreted as being attributable to the fact that the
outcomes of this kind of political process are more beneficial to the
population, because politicians are more strongly induced to follow
voters’ wishes than is the case in a more indirect democracy or a nondemocracy. In addition, a comparison between Swiss citizens (who have
the right to vote) and foreigners living in Switzerland (who do not have
that right but share in the outcomes) shows that citizens value the
possibility of political participation, irrespective of outcomes, i.e. they
derive procedural well-being from their participation rights.417

The happiness literature is less developed on the optimal political
institutions that foster a democracy that promotes overall well-being.418
Yet one fundamental belief of any democracy is the value of civic
engagement and responsive governance in promoting well-being. Public
confidence in government “is essential for social stability and the
functioning of democracy. . . . and for economic growth.”419 So well-being
is derived from both the government’s responsiveness to its citizens’
concerns and the governmental institutions themselves.
As the happiness literature develops, it can assess the countries’ optimal
legal and informal institutions that promote a well-functioning democracy,
as well as the role of competition policy. Congress has repeatedly
recognized that democracies function better when economic and political
power is dispersed. As Aristotle wrote, “[T]he best form of political
association is one where power is vested in the middle class, and, secondly,
that good government is attainable in those cities where there is a large
middle class—large enough . . . [to] prevent either of the opposing extremes
from becoming dominant.”420 So, too, according to one recent economic
analysis, countries prosper economically when legal institutions disperse
political and economic power.421 First, extractive institutions have more to
415. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
416. BOK, supra note 12, at 23.
417. FREY, supra note 12, at 64.
418. OECD, supra note 17, at 187 (“While civic engagement and governance are
essential for democracies, they are also very difficult to measure.”).
419. Id. at 192.
420. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. 4, ch. 11, § 10, at 158–59 (R.F. Stalley ed., Ernest
Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
421. See ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 185, at 323. Although they do not rely on
the happiness literature, they consider whether the political and economic institutions were
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fear from creative destruction.422 Although the elites prefer some economic
growth from which to extract wealth, creative destruction, while promoting
innovation, also can destabilize the entrenched power.423 The elites will
sacrifice dynamic economic growth when it threatens their power.424
Moreover, there is less incentive to innovate if the politically and
economically powerful appropriate the gains.425 When the highly coveted
economic and political power is concentrated in extractive institutions,
political instability increases, as outside groups seek to displace the
entrenched (not necessarily to promote more inclusive political and
economic institutions but to expropriate the gains themselves).426
Consequently, competition policy can promote an inclusive economy that
promotes well-being. As the MIT and Harvard economists have observed,
[T]he presence of markets is not by itself a guarantee of inclusive
institutions. Markets can be dominated by a few firms, charging
exorbitant prices and blocking the entry of more efficient rivals and new
technologies. Markets, left to their own devices, can cease to be
inclusive, becoming increasingly dominated by the economically and
politically powerful. Inclusive economic institutions require not just
markets, but inclusive markets that create a level playing field and
economic opportunities for the majority of the people. Widespread
monopoly, backed by the political power of the elite, contradicts this.427

Second, policymakers can assess the extent to which dispersed economic
and political power, besides promoting democracy, promotes well-being
directly. The happiness research suggests that “decentralized political
decisions raise life satisfaction . . . . Individuals feel better at ease and
better informed when decisions affecting local issues are decided at a local
level rather than by a centralized government unit sometimes far from the
issues at stake.”428 The happiness literature also finds that well-being is
extractive or inclusive. Inclusive institutions “enforce property rights, create a level playing
field, and encourage investments in new technologies and skills” and “are more conducive to
economic growth than extractive economic institutions that are structured to extract
resources from the many by the few and that fail to protect property rights or provide
incentives for economic activity.” Id. at 429–30. Extractive economic and political
institutions concentrate power in the hands of the few, “who will then have incentives to
maintain and develop extractive economic institutions for their benefit and use the resources
they obtain to cement their hold on political power.” Id. at 430. Countries generally
prospered under inclusive economies “where political rights were much more broadly
distributed, where the government was accountable and responsive to citizens, and where the
great mass of people could take advantage of economic opportunities.” Id. at 3–4.
422. Id. at 430.
423. Id. at 84, 430.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 77–78.
426. Id. at 430.
427. Id. at 323.
428. Frey & Stutzer, supra note 141, at 662–63; see also FREY, supra note 12, at 64
(“Democratic institutions increase people’s well-being considerably. An increase in the
extent of democracy by one mark on the ten-point Polity IV Index increases reported
happiness to an extent similar to an increase of $4,500 per year in an individual’s income.”).
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strongly correlated with political freedom (more so in wealthier
countries)429 and economic freedom (more so in less developed
countries).430
Competition “is first and foremost a system of decentralized economic
power.”431 Competition policy can maintain a competitive market structure
by, inter alia, lessening regulatory entry barriers, enjoining mergers to
monopoly, and arresting trends toward concentration at their incipiency. In
doing so, antitrust’s structural remedies disperse not only economic power
but political power with fewer monopolies to regulate and less rents to
capture.432 As Dr. Kahn stated, the “essential task of public policy in a free
enterprise system should be to preserve the framework of a fair field and no
favors, letting the results take care of themselves.”433 I do not contend that
increasing competition always increases well-being.
As I discuss
elsewhere, competition does not always benefit society.
Greater
competition, at times, yields more behavioral exploitation of consumers,
greater waste from lobbying (and small businesses can be politically
powerful, at times more so than large corporations), and more unethical
behavior.434 Competition can produce more instability, bankruptcies, and
anxiety, which in turn cause greater unhappiness.
Although competition at times can increase misery, the relative
unhappiness of citizens in centrally planned economies suggest that the
economic freedom and opportunity available in competitive markets are
better alternatives. Misery and pauperism are associated more often with
monopolies than competitive markets.435 The principal evil of monopolies
429. Frey & Stutzer, supra note 70, at 423 (“Political freedom measures the possibility
for citizens to engage in the democratic process or, conversely, the restrictions on political
participation. It is composed of two sub-indices, the first relating to civil rights, such as
freedom of speech (with eleven items), and the second to political rights (nine items).”).
430. Id. (Economic freedom “measures the opportunity for individuals to engage in the
free exchange of goods, services, and labor. It is based on sub-indices (each in turn
composed of a number of items), referring to the security of money, free enterprise, freedom
from excessive taxation, and the possibility of undertaking monetary transfers.”).
431. ADAMS & BROCK, supra note 174, at 98.
432. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., and Vasileios
Madouros, Economist, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s
36th Economic Policy Symposium: The Dog and the Frisbee (Aug. 31, 2012), available at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2012/ah.pdf.
433. Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 HARV. L. REV. 28, 39 (1953).
Ordoliberal legal scholar Franz Böhm, when working on the concept of
“Leistungswettbewerb,” used as a central tenet that the rules for this market game should be
shaped so that only the quality of performance (merit) should determine market success.
Kerber, supra note 36, at 21.
434. Maurice E. Stucke, Is Competition Always Good?, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2157193.
435. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 101–02 (1872) (“All
monopolies in any known trade or manufacture are an invasion of these privileges, for they
encroach upon the liberty of citizens to acquire property and pursue happiness, and were
held void at common law in the great Case of Monopolies, decided during the reign of
Queen Elizabeth.”); Stites v. Norton, 101 S.W. 1189, 1190 (Ky. Ct. App. 1907) (describing
how the framers of the state constitution “had in mind the great importance of preventing
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historically was their “interference with the liberty of the subject to pursue
for his maintenance and that of his family any lawful trade or employment,”
a liberty “assumed to be the natural right of every Englishman.”436
Other factors also suggest that an unconcentrated marketplace promotes
well-being. A competitive market structure promotes economic opportunity
and personal autonomy437—a key predictor of well-being.438 Citizens can
choose to purchase from (and work for) firms that align with their personal
religious and ethical values.439 When a firm engages in exploitative, unfair
behavior, a competitive market provides alternatives.440 A competitive
labor market provides workers the opportunity “to fulfill their own
ambitions, to develop skills and abilities, to feel useful in society and to
build self-esteem.”441 Likewise, positive sum competition enables richer
social connections. People can use their personal “vigor, imagination,
Thus, a competitive
devotion, and ingenuity” to help others.442
marketplace, in dispersing economic and political power, can foster
activities, which are correlated generally with healthier and happier people.

monopolies and affording opportunities for competition in all things which are necessary for
the welfare and happiness of the people”); THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 24–25 (Clarence H.
Miller trans., Yale Univ. Press 2001) (1516).
436. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 104.
437. United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388 (1923) (“The Sherman Act
was intended to secure equality of opportunity and to protect the public against evils
commonly incident to monopolies and those abnormal contracts and combinations which
tend directly to suppress the conflict for advantage called competition—the play of the
contending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest desire for gain.”); Charles A. Ramsay
Co. v. Assoc. Bill Posters of U.S. & Can., 260 U.S. 501, 512 (1923) (“The fundamental
purpose of the Sherman Act was to secure equality of opportunity and to protect the public
against evils commonly incident to destruction of competition through monopolies and
combinations in restraint of trade.”).
438. BOK, supra note 12, at 23; NETTLE, supra note 12, at 74.
439. Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A. (USA), 524 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 2008) (antitrust
injuries include “[c]oercive activity that prevents its victims from making free choices
between market alternatives” (quoting Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 (1983))); SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 261, at 19
(“When the no-barriers-to-entry condition of perfect competition is satisfied, individuals are
free to choose whatever trade or profession they prefer, limited only by their own talent and
skill and by their ability to raise the (presumably modest) amount of capital required.”); see
also HAYEK, supra note 33, at 127.
440. Seacoast Motors of Salisbury, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 6, 9
(1st Cir. 2001) (“The central aim of the antitrust laws is to protect consumers against certain
abusive business practices—especially price-fixing and monopoly.”); Kahneman et al., supra
note 383, at 735; see also PAUL J. ZAK, Values and Value in Moral Economics, in MORAL
MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 259, 276 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008)
(“[T]he kinds of market institutions that create wealth and enable happiness and freedom of
choice are those that resonate with the social nature of human beings who have an innate
sense of shared values of right, wrong, and fair.”).
441. OECD, supra note 17, at 58.
442. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); OECD, supra note
321, at 14 (“Not only [do the availability of jobs and earnings] increase people’s command
over resources, but they also provide people with a chance to fulfill their own ambitions, to
develop skills and abilities, to feel useful in society and to build self-esteem.”).
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Third, policymakers, using advances in the happiness literature, can
assess how the quality of governmental institutions can promote well-being
and the extent to which competition policy is aligned with these quality
metrics. Well-being is correlated with the “observance of the rule of law,
efficient governmental agencies, a low level of violence and corruption, a
high degree of trust in public officials (especially the police), and
responsive encounters by citizens with public agencies and officials.”443
Thus, policymakers can assess whether their antitrust legal standards are
closely aligned with the rule of law, the independence of the agencies and
courts from rent-seeking and corruption, and the public’s trust in their
antitrust enforcers and courts.
Fourth, economists can use the happiness literature’s econometric tools
to assess directly the correlation between a jurisdiction’s antitrust
enforcement and its citizens’ well-being. Assessing the benefits or harms
from competition policy is difficult. The typical assessments are estimates
of how much consumers overpaid for products or services from a
conspiracy, or the innovations in the industry after a monopoly, such as
AT&T, was broken up. Researchers, however, would have several
challenges in estimating the correlation between antitrust enforcement and
subjective well-being. Determining whether a country has a competition
law is easy. But assessing the nature of antitrust enforcement is more
difficult.444 One cannot assume that more enforcement activity necessarily
means a more effective competition policy. Also, it may be difficult to
disentangle antitrust from other factors that promote well-being. An
effective antitrust enforcement program typically requires other important
democratic institutions that correlate with well-being, such as low
corruption, an efficient and independent judiciary, the rule of law,
representation, etc. But one reason that these other legal institutions
function effectively is because economic power is dispersed, due to an
effective competition policy.
Finally, the happiness literature can help policymakers address
competition policy’s inherent tradeoffs. In many instances, such as
preventing a merger to monopoly, antitrust enforcement advances the law’s
economic, social, political, and moral goals. But competition policy at
times involves tradeoffs, including (1) mergers, whose efficiencies benefit
the company, with little prospect of being passed along to downstream
consumers; (2) increases in interbrand competition at the expense of
reducing intrabrand competition; (3) mergers with anticompetitive effects in
one market offset by procompetitive benefits in another market; (4) mergers
and restraints that yield dynamic efficiencies but also higher supracompetitive prices; (5) mergers that yield greater productive efficiencies but
443. BOK, supra note 12, at 23; see also CMEPSP REPORT, supra note 16, at 178–79.
444. For example, suppose one wanted to assess the relationship between antitrust
enforcement activity and well-being. If Country A relies mainly on per se illegal rules, its
prohibitions may be clearer to the public, necessitating fewer enforcement actions than
Country B, which relies mostly on a fact-specific, effects-based legal analysis.
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reduce product variety; and (6) mergers that yield productive efficiencies
but increase systemic risk and the competitive distortions of firms too big
and too integral to fail.445 Nor does one avoid these tradeoffs with an
economic goal such as consumer welfare, since mergers and restraints at
times benefit some consumers while harming others.446 Similarly, wellbeing raises its own trade-off issues (such as a restraint that increases some
people’s well-being at the expense of others). But if policymakers adopt a
utilitarian approach, the happiness literature can help inform these tradeoffs. The literature, for example, examines the trade-off between
unemployment and inflation in calculating a misery index.447 If both
inflation and unemployment affect one’s happiness, the happiness
economics studies seek to estimate their magnitudes: “[H]ow much
unemployment is equal to a percentage point of higher inflation, or vice
versa.”448
Consequently, the happiness literature can help policymakers assess in a
post-materialistic society the importance of antitrust’s noneconomic values
relative to economic values, such as minimizing deadweight welfare loss.
But even if the happiness literature down the road cannot assess the
relationship between effective antitrust enforcement and well-being, the
literature today already draws into question the framework used over the
past thirty years to guide U.S. antitrust policy. The happiness literature
provides another important metric to assess competition policy’s political,
social, and moral values, which have been degraded over the years. In
short, to promote overall well-being, any competition policy in a developed
economy must include both material well-being and quality-of-life factors.
CONCLUSION
Courts and enforcers should not constrict competition policy to narrow
economic goals (such as promoting consumer surplus or reducing
deadweight welfare loss). Doing so contravenes Congress’s intent and our
democratic values, such as dispersing economic power. Nor should courts
and enforcers in their antitrust review conflate what is easier to measure
(such as a merger’s impact on short-term pricing) with what is important.
After the economic crisis, competition policy’s political, social, and moral
concerns of concentrated economic and political power, while not easily
measureable, cannot be ignored.
445. Stucke, Goals, supra note 8, at 604–08; see also TURNER, supra note 329, at xi;
Kirkwood, supra note 380, at 2427 (“[D]ebate about antitrust goals is a debate about how to
evaluate such tradeoffs.”).
446. Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2471, 2480 (2013) (“[W]hen consumers are affected differently by a challenged practice,
computing net consumer harm or benefit can be just as difficult as computing net benefit
under a general welfare test when the practice creates both producer gains and consumer
losses.”).
447. Dolan et al., supra note 107, at 109–10.
448. Di Tella & MacCulloch, supra note 331, at 37–38 (finding that “a percentage point
of unemployment causes 4.7 times more unhappiness than a percentage point of inflation”).
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The current discontent over the imbalance in economic and political
power is worrisome. Democracies cannot thrive with the current wealth
and income inequality, social immobility, and distrust of our bloated
unresponsive federal bureaucracy. The United States cannot continue to
shed its fundamental civic, ethical, and moral values along its path from an
inclusive to extractive economy. Our economy generally, and competition
policy specifically, can and should deliver more than the mindless pursuit
of accumulating cheap products.
As Galbraith wrote, “Economic
development enables us to pay the price; it is why we have development.
We do not have development in order to make our surroundings more
hideous, our culture more meretricious or our lives less complete.”449
Now is time for the agencies and courts to reinvigorate competition
policy. For starters they must reincorporate competition law’s political,
social, and moral objectives into simpler legal presumptions, which the
Court once did with its incipiency standard. Greater consumer surplus,
greater productive efficiency, and less deadweight welfare loss are
important objectives but are hardly determinative in well-developed, postindustrial economies like the United States. Consumer surplus should be
viewed, not as the aim of competition policy, but instead as one incidental
byproduct of a competitive process that promotes economic opportunity and
freedom.450 Political, social, and moral values play as large a role, if not
larger, in promoting a sustainable, inclusive economy that increases the
well-being of the many, rather than the few.

449. Galbraith, supra note 71, at 122.
450. See JOHN KAY, OBLIQUITY: WHY OUR GOALS ARE BEST ACHIEVED INDIRECTLY
(2010).

